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Article 3

et al.: Disregard of the Corporate Entity

NOTES
DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY
The characteristicof corporationswhich gives shareholderslimited liability has profoundly affected American economic growth. Unfortunately, economic growth has not been the sole result of limited liability,
for the corporate device can be used to achieve unjust ends. Disregard
of the corporate entity, which eliminates limited shareholder liability,
is an equitable remedy invoked when the benefits of incorporationare
outweighed by equities in favor of unpaid creditorsof the corporation.
Judicial evolvement of the corporate disregard doctrine, however, has
been equivocal and confusing; few standardsexist to guide understanding. This Note evaluates the doctrine as it has evolved in Minnesota
and other jurisdictions.In addition, this Note offers a suggested approach which attempts to identify the relevant policies and facts that
should be considered when a court disregards a corporate entity.
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INTRODUCTION

The benefits derived from combination of resources and talents for
common enterprise are exemplified nowhere better than by the private
business corporation. The advantages of incorporation are evidenced by
the overwhelming acceptance of the corporate device in American business;' it has been a major factor contributing to this nation's phenomenal industrial growth.' Through the use of corporations, investors can
combine capital and participate in the profits of large and small business enterprises with the advantages of perpetual existence, free transferability of interest, and centralized management. 3 For these reasons,
the corporation is accorded a favored status in the law. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has recognized this status, stating: "The corporation is
of the utmost importance to the industrial and commercial world. It is
essential to the welfare of our business interests."'
Legislatures have endowed corporations with certain characteristics.
Although limited liability has not always been one of these characteristics,' it is clear now that the attribute of limited shareholder liability
1.See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES § 1 (2d ed. 1970); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTI-

CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1977, at 258 (2,144,000 corporate tax returns filed in
1976).
2. See, e.g., H. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS § 1 (rev. ed. 1946); Oleck, Remedies for
Abuses of Corporate Status, 9 WAKE FOREST L. Rav. 463, 466 (1973) (corporation invaluable in the economic development of the United States); cf. I. WORMSER, DISREGARD OF
THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS 2-3 (1927) (corporation allows
trade on a scale commensurate with modern needs).
3. See, e.g., H. BALLANTINE, supra note 2, § 1; H. HENN, supra note 1, §§ 73-75.
4. Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 373, 200 N.W.76,87 (1924); accord, Ballantine,
Stockholders'Liabilityin Minnesota, 7 MINN. L. REv. 79, 79-80 (1923) (corporation greatest factor in modern business). The status also carries with it an unqualified responsibility
to act compatibly with the public interest. See Viiliainen v. American Finnish Workers
Soc'y, 236 Minn. 412, 416, 53 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1952); In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn.
207, 212-13, 45 N.W.2d 388, 392 (1950).
5. The early legislatures were unwilling to grant limited liability to shareholders of

industrial corporations. See Dodd, The Evolution of Limited Liability in American Industry: Massachusetts, 61 HA~v. L. REv. 1351, 1352 (1948).
Minnesota was among those states reluctant to free stockholders from liability for the
debt of the corporations in which they owned stock. The Minnesota Constitution as
adopted in 1857 provided: "Each stockholder in any corporation shall be liable to the
amount of stock held or owned by him." MINN. CONST. art. 10, § 3 (1857) (amended 1872,
1930, and 1954; repealed 1974). An 1872 amendment inserted an exception for corporations
"organized for the purpose of carrying on any kind of manufacturing or mechanical business.. . ." Id. (1872). The most significant development occurred in 1930 when the section
was rewritten to vest in the legislature the power to "limit or otherwise regulate the
liability of'stockholders or members of corporations ...." Id. (1930). Only one exception
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has played a major role in increasing the popularity of incorporation.'
Without limited liability the amount of capital needed for modem business probably could not have been assembled. 7 The courts recognize this
advantage, holding that incorporation even for the sole purpose of
achieving limited liability is legally permissible.' Yet the limited liability attribute is not absolute; the courts have retained the power to ignore
the corporate entity and impose shareholder liability in appropriate
cases. This judicial power, labelled the doctrine of "disregard of the
corporate entity"' or "piercing the corporate veil,"'" developed to correct
the inevitable injustices that were not intended to be sanctioned by
incorporation.
The doctrine of corporate disregard is an equitable remedy." As with
any equitable remedy, the doctrine involves the balancing of competing
policies." The policies favoring incorporation therefore must be balto the legislative power remained: shareholders of banking or trust corporations were still
liable for the debts of the corporation "contracted prior to any transfer of such stock and
such individual liability shall continue for one year after any transfer of such stock .... "
Pursuant to the 1930 amendment, the legislature passed Act of Apr. 18, 1933, ch. 300, §
18, 1933 Minn. Laws 406 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 301.19 (1976)), which effectively limited the liability of shareholders for the debts of the corporation once the shareholder had complied with the contract for subscription. The 1954 amendment removed
the banking exception. The current version of the Minnesota Constitution, following its
restructuring in 1974, see Act of Apr. 10, 1974, ch. 409, § 1, 1974 Minn. Laws 787, eliminated this provision entirely.
6. See Johnson v. Kinchen, 160 So. 2d 296, 299 (La. Ct. App. 1964) (limited liability
encourages and promotes business which provides employment, creates sales of goods, and
adds to the nation's economic and financial stability and prosperity); I. WORMSER, LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

2 (1914) (limited liability the "greatest contribution of our

civilization"); Ballantine, supra note 4, at 79-80 (limited liability "the corporation's most
precious characteristic"). Lay persons assume unquestionably that shareholders have limited liability. See Gillespie, The Thin Corporate Line: Loss of Limited Liability
Protection, 45 N.D. L. REV. 363, 363 (1969). Limited liability, however, may assume
decreasing importance because of the concentration of investment in comparatively few
corporations. Fuller, The IncorporatedIndividual:A Study of the One-Man Company, 51
HARM. L. REv. 1373, 1376 (1938).
7. See H. BALLANTINE, supra note 2, § 1; cf. W. COOK, THE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION
LAW 19 (1925) ("limited liability is the 'open sesame' to the accumulated wealth of the
world"); Radin, The Endless Problem of CorporatePersonality, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 643,
654 (1932) (in medieval Europe men would often decline to enter into business transactions unless they could limit their liability).
8. See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 361-62 (1944) (limited liability is the rule
of corporations, not the exception); Gledhill v. Fisher & Co., 272 Mich. 353, 359, 262 N.W.
371, 373 (1935); 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.2
(rev. perm. ed. 1974).
9. In re Will of Clarke, 204 Minn. 574, 579, 284 N.W. 876, 879 (1939).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Erickson-Hellekson-Vye Co. v. A. Wells Co., 217 Minn. 361, 381-82, 15
N.W.2d 162, 173 (1944); 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 8, § 41.2.
12. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 610,
617 n.7 (N.D. Me. 1977). The disregard remedy must be evaluated in terms of the two
strong competing policies involved in the cases: the necessity to foster the growth of the
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anced against the public policies supporting performance of contracts,
repayment of debt, and compensation for personal injury. 3 Normally
this evaluation occurs in cases involving close, parent-subsidiary, or
affiliated corporations because the doctrine is rarely invoked against
large publicly held corporations having many shareholders." The more
liberal use of the corporate disregard remedy over the last half-century
reflects the frequently superior equities of the wronged creditor vis-&-vis
the somewhat more abstract benefits to the national economy flowing
from corporateness.' 5 This Note will examine the doctrine of corporate
disregard as it has developed in Minnesota. 8 Moreover, alternative
theories and a suggested approach will be set forth. 7 Finally, exceptional applications of the doctrine involving policies not normally relevant to most disregard actions will be evaluated. 8
II.

A.

MINNESOTA LAW

Traditional Concepts

The Minnesota Supreme Court has a long history of struggling with
the scope of the corporate disregard doctrine. As in most jurisdictions,
however, the Minnesota court has yet to elucidate standards concerning
the doctrine,' although the court in a recent decision has taken some
corporate style of doing business and the need to compensate or pay corporate creditors.
See Dobbyn, A PracticalApproach to Consistency in Veil-Piercing Cases, 19 U. KAN. L.
Ray. 185, 185 (1971). A triangle of interests is presented: a plaintiff seeking to enforce an
obligation, a corporation being held directly liable to the plaintiff, and a shareholder on
whom the plaintiff is seeking to shift the liability. Id.
13. See generally 1 W. FLzrcHER, supra note 8, § 41.3 (contracts, debts); W. PROSsER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Toi'rs § 4 (4th ed. 1971) (personal injury).
14. See F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.09a (2d ed. 1971 & Supp.
1977); Gillespie, supra note 6, at 378.
15. See McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 504, 515 (1910) (growing tendency to
pierce corporate veil); Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Snyder, 79 F.2d 263, 266 (8th Cir.
1935); Note, The Bodies Behind the Veil, 76 S. AFR. L.J. 89, 90 (1959) (judges in America
are more willing to pierce the veil than judges in South Africa or Great Britain).
16. See notes 19-120 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 121-97 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 198-223 infra and accompanying text.
19. See Note, Corporations-Disclosingthe Actual Identity of Related Corporationsfor
the Purpose of Ignoring the Corporate Fiction When One is Insolvent, 4 MINN. L. Rv.
219, 221 (1920) (no disregard rule has been established which might furnish accurate test
of disregard). See generally Wang, The CorporateEntity Concept (Or Fiction Theory) and
the Modern Business Organization,28 MINN. L. Rav. 341 (1944).
A federal court in 1905 formulated what has been described as a "landmark" disregard
rule: "[When the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association
of persons." United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (E.D.
Wis. 1905). A leading commentator apparently embraced the formulation. See Wormser,
Piercing the Veil of CorporateEntity, 12 COLum. L. Rgv. 496, 517 (1912). The Minnesota
Federal District Court apparently adopted the Milwaukee formulation in the decision of
In re O'Brien, 40 F.2d 554, 555 (D. Minn. 1930). The rule's weakness is its inutility as an
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steps in that direction."0
In the latter part of the last century and the early part of the present
one the Minnesota Supreme Court was reluctant to apply the doctrine
of corporate disregard."' The court's attitude was based primarily on its
great respect for the independence of the corporate entity, perhaps as a
consequence of the Industrial Revolution." For example, in Gallagher
v. GermaniaBrewing Co., 13 decided in 1893, the court stated that "it has
been found absolutely essential, for the administration of justice, to
treat a corporation as a collective entity, without regard to its individual
shareholders. In no other way can title to corporate property be kept free
from complication and uncertainty.' '2 Similarly, in Moe v. Harris,5 the
court denied corporate creditors a remedy against shareholders of a
corporation that had subscribed no stock, kept no books, adopted no
bylaws, held no meetings, and elected no officers. Thus the court established early a firm respect for the corporate entity.
Despite the court's initial reluctance to invoke the corporate disregard
remedy, the injustices that can result from improper use of the corporate
form caused the court to change its position. The factors the court has
considered when deciding whether to invoke the corporate disregard
analytic tool or standard by which to measure conduct. See Dobbyn, supra note 12, at
185-86 (years of quoting the formula have added little to its usefulness).
20. See notes 62-65 infra and accompanying text.
21. Minnesota commentators perhaps contributed to that attitude, urging that the
corporate entity only be pierced in cases of actual common law fraud. See Note,
Corporations-Disregardingthe Concept of a Separate CorporateEntity-Especially in
Cases Lacking Elements of Fraud, 10 MINN. L. Rlv.598, 599-600 (1926). For an early view
advocating the abolition of the corporate disregard remedy on the rationale that the same
result can almost always be reached through other legal principles, see 20 H~av. L. Rzv.
223, 224 (1906).
22. One authority states:
[Tihe steaming breath of the Industrial Revolution was hot on the backs of
businessmen and lawyers. The barriers created by the South Sea Bubble Acts
began to give way in England in the first ten years of the 19th century; and in
the second and third decades here the old prejudices [against corporations]
went by the board.
...The corporate clothing of the early 19th century did not fit the burgeoning
industry of the second half; and the community, perhaps wisely, decided that
it would rather have economic growth than social control.
Berle, HistoricalInheritanceof American Corporations,in N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW, SOCIAL

MEANING OF LEGAL CONCEPTS

189, 195, 199 (1950).

23. 53 Minn. 214, 54 N.W. 1115 (1893).
24. Id. at 219, 54 N.W. at 1116.
25. 142 Minn. 442, 172 N.W. 494 (1919).
26. The Minnesota court offered the following practical reasons for not piercing the
corporate veil: (1) title to corporate property must be kept free from complication, (2) the
transferable nature of stock supports keeping shareholders distinct from the corporate
entity, and (3) the individual and corporate obligations of the shareholders should be kept
separate. See Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 214, 219, 54 N.W. 1115, 1116
(1893).
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remedy include fraud, failure to observe corporate formalities, inadequate capitalization, excessive control or dominance, and presence of
subsidiary or affiliated corporations.Y The court's treatment of each of
these factors will be discussed below.
1. Fraud
The most important doctrinal shift in Minnesota corporate disregard
law, presaged by earlier opinions,2 occurred in Matchan v. Phoenix
Land Investment Co." In that case the shareholder utilized several corporations through which he passed property in an attempt to avoid his
creditors. Characterizing the transactions as "grossly and intentionally
fraudulent,"3 0 the court held that the shareholder's fraud was attributable to the corporation. In a vivid example of the metaphoric language
so familiar to this area of the law, the court stated the following rule:3
Where a corporation has been organized and used as an instrument
of fraud; where, as here, an individual has incorporated himself in order
to hinder and, if possible, defraud creditors, courts will go as far as
necessary in disregarding the corporation and its doing in order to
accomplish justice. Such a corporation is a mere parasitic growth, a
mass of fungus, which will be lopped off clean whenever necessary to
sound results.
Thus, the court in Matchan established the basic rule that the corporate
entity will be disregarded when used by its shareholders to perpetrate a
32
fraud.
The dominant theme in Minnesota corporate disregard law since
Matchan has been the requirement of fraudulent shareholder conduct,n
although a recent case, ManufacturersBuilding, Inc. v. Heller,3 allowed
disregard without a finding of fraud. In Heller the court disregarded a
corporate entity to decide a dispute between its shareholders after the
trial court found that fraud was not involved. This apparent contradic27. See Note, supra note 19.
28. See Erickson v. Revere Elevator Co., 110 Minn. 443, 444, 126 N.W. 130, 131 (1910);
State v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 110 Minn. 415, 433, 126 N.W. 126, 129 (1910).
29. 159 Minn. 132, 198 N.W. 417 (1924).
30. Id. at 137, 198 N.W. at 419.
31. Id. at 138, 198 N.W. at 420.
32. It is well established that fraud is a leading factor in disregard law. See 1 W.
FLETCHER, supra note 8, § 44; Note, supra note 21.
33. See Ahlm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 264, 143 N.W.2d 65, 69 (1966); Fewell v.
Tappan, 223 Minn. 483, 495, 27 N.W.2d 648, 655 (1947); Whitney v. Leighton, 225 Minn.
1, 8, 30 N.W.2d 329, 333 (1947), aff'd on rehearing,225 Minn. 12, 30 N.W.2d 335 (1948);
Central Motors & Supply Co. v. Brown, 219 Minn. 467, 469, 18 N.W.2d 236, 237 (1945);
Lake Park Dev. Co. v. Paul Steenberg Constr. Co., 201 Minn. 396, 402, 276 N.W. 651, 655
(1937); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. A. Enkema Holding Co., 196 Minn. 154, 157-58,
264, N.W. 576, 577-78 (1936).
34. 306 Minn. 180, 235 N.W.2d 825 (1975), noted in 3 WM. MrrcHEmi L. REv. 293 (1977).
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tion can be explained by the fact that Heller did not involve corporate
creditors but rather concerned a dispute among shareholders of a close
corporation. In such a case, disregard can be justified on the rationale
that partnership law often establishes more appropriately the rights of
close-corporation shareholders inter se when third-party creditors are
not involved. 5 When third-party creditors are involved the fraud requirement is probably still applicable.
Cases following Matchan indicate that the fraud requirement does not
contemplate strict common law fraud, but rather fraud in the more
general sense of using the corporate entity in an unjust manner." These
cases suggest that other factors may be relevant to whether the corporate entity should be disregarded, such as failure to follow corporate
formalities, 7 inadequate capitalization,1' and shareholder dominance of
the corporation, 3 but generally only if they are coupled with fraud or
themselves result in fraud." Although fraud has dominated Minnesota
corporate disregard law, the court has given weight to these other factors
and therefore they do merit discussion.
2.

Corporate Formalities

Corporations are expected to follow certain formalities, such as adopting bylaws," preparing minutes, 2 keeping corporate and shareholder
assets separate, 3 and holding shareholders' and directors' meetings."
Failure to comply with these requirements, however, is not fatal under
the statutes to the corporate existence of an otherwise de jure corporation. 5 Thus, in Whitney v. Leighton,'4 the court held that evidence of
35. See 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 293, 295 (1977).
36. See Erickson-Hellekson-Vye Co. v. A. Wells Co., 217 Minn. 361, 380-82, 15 N.W.2d
162, 172-73 (1944) (corporate entity will be disregarded to obviate inequitable results);
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. A. Ankema Holding Co., 196 Minn. 154, 158, 264 N.W.
576, 578 (1936) (corporate entity will be disregarded to achieve some strong equitable
result). This definition of fraud in disregard law is followed by most authorities. See, e.g.,
1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 8, § 44 (actual or constructive fraud). Constructive or legal
fraud has been defined to mean a breach of a legal or equitable duty that tends to deceive
others or to injure public interests. Stern v. National City Co., 25 F. Supp. 948, 957 (D.
Minn. 1938), aff'd sub noam. City Co. v. Stern, 110 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1940), rev'd on other
grounds per curiam, 312 U.S 666 (1941).
37. See notes 41-51 infra and accompanying text.
38. See notes 52-58 infra and accompanying text.
39. See notes 59-65 infra and accompanying text.
40. See Note, supra note 19, at 222, 227 (failure to observe formalities and shareholder
dominance are merely evidentiary facts which are not conclusive).

41. See MINN.

STAT.

§ 301.24 (1976).

42. See id.§ 301.34(2).
43. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Germania Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 214, 219, 54 N.W. 1115, 1116
(1893).
44. See MINN. STAT. §§ 301.25, .28 subd. 4(3) (1976).
45. See Moe v. Harris, 142 Minn. 442, 172 N.W. 494 (1919).
46. 225 Minn. 1, 30 N.W.2d 329 (1947), aff'd on rehearing, 225 Minn. 12, 30 N.W.2d
335 (1948).
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failure to follow corporate formalities alone was not sufficient to justify
corporate disregard. In Whitney, the defendant shareholder intermingled corporate and personal funds and failed to keep separate corporate
financial records, yet the court held that "[i]n the absence of fraud,
the corporation must be treated as a legal entity separate and apart from
its stockholders."'" Whitney seems to have made it clear that lack of
formalities, without a showing of fraud, is not sufficient to justify the
piercing remedy."
Nonetheless, failure to observe corporate formalities is a factor the
court can and normally will consider. For example, in General Underwriters, Inc. v. Kline," decided after Whitney, the court disregarded the
corporate entity, emphasizing that the corporation kept no books of
account, had no corporate minutes for the preceeding four years, could
not locate its corporate records, and had no separate corporate offices.
The General Underwriters court also found the defendant shareholder
had used the corporation as an instrument to defraud creditors.
Evidence of failure to observe corporate formalities pervades corporate disregard law.' This emphasis suggests that the failure to observe
corporate formalities is sufficient by itself to justify disregard of the
corporate entity. Analysis of Whitney and General Underwriters, however, suggests that failure to observe formalities is relevant because it
may show fraud or injustice. Thus, evidence of failure to observe corporate formalities is relevant in Minnesota corporate disregard law, but
perhaps for reasons different than those in other jurisdictions. Moreover,
failure to observe formalities may indicate the shareholder's view of the
business organization, and the court legitimately may take this into
consideration in deciding whether to disregard the corporate entity."
3.

Inadequate Capitalization

The Minnesota Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to delineate the role that inadequate capitalization of a corporation by its shareholders should play in relation to the corporate disregard remedy. 52 A
47. 225 Minn. at 8, 30 N.W.2d at 333.
48. Accord, Moe v. Harris, 142 Minn. 442, 172 N.W. 494 (1919) (court denied piercing
remedy and suggested creditors might have a remedy against the shareholders on a common law fraud theory).
49. 233 Minn. 345, 46 N.W.2d 794 (1951).
50. See generally Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 428 (1972).
51. E.g., Edward Finch Co. v. Robie, 12 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1926); United States v.
Figur, 80 F. Supp. 140, 141-42 (D. Minn. 1948). Disregard based on failure to observe
formalities and fraud has been labelled the "identity" rule of the doctrine. E.g., Dobbyn,
supra note 12, at 186-87. The metaphor "identity" suggests an impermissible failure to
separate personal and corporate business and thus serves as a basis for disregard. Id.
52. Other courts have struggled with the role of inadequate capitalization. Compare,
e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 579-80, 364 P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643
(1961) (in bank) (shareholders are personally liable "when they provide inadequate capitalization and actively participate in the conduct of corporate affairs") with, e.g., Harris
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decision sometimes cited by other authorities 3 as a leading inadequate
capitalization case is Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario Power Co." In
Erickson a subsidiary corporation caused property damage to the individual plaintiff. The subsidiary was without funds to pay for the damage, apparently because the defendant parent corporation capitalized
the subsidiary in a manner that left it without any revenue. The court
held the parent corporation liable for the subsidiary's tort, presumably
at least in part because the parent caused the subsidiary to be inadequately capitalized. Erickson, however, is not without ambiguity. The
court purported to impose shareholder liability on agency principles
rather than by disregarding the corporate entity of the subsidiary.55
Moreover, the court did not state clearly the role inadequate capitalization played in its decision. Nonetheless, Erickson does provide support
for the proposition that inadequate capitalization can be a reason for
imposing shareholder liability."
The Erickson decision could suggest that inadequate capitalization is
sufficient, without a showing of fraud, to disregard a corporate entity. 57
The court has never decided this issue, but it has suggested that inadequate capitalization is relevant because it tends to prove that fraud
occurred." Although Minnesota law is by no means clear on this point,
this suggests that inadequate capitalization probably is not sufficient to
invoke the piercing remedy unless it amounts to a fraud upon the corporation's creditors.
v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App. 3d 837, 841, 87 Cal. Rptr. 614, 617-18 (1970) ("Appellants would
have us declare that, per se, inadequate capitalization renders the shareholders, officers
and directors liable for the obligations of the corporation. They cite no case so holding,
and we know of none.").
53. See, e.g., Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary
Corporations, 39 YALE L.J. 193, 203 (1929); Note, Inadequately Capitalized Subsidiaries,
19 U. CH. L. Ray. 872, 872 n.3 (1952).
54. 134 Minn. 209, 158 N.W. 979 (1916).
55. Id. at 214, 158 N.W. at 981; see 77 U. PA. L. Rzv. 808, 809 (1929) (citing Erickson
for proposition that agency law is superior to application of disregard doctrine). For a
general discussion of the law of agency and shareholder liability, see notes 89-93 infra and
accompanying text.
56. Accord, United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 28-29 (D. Minn.)
(subsidiary operated merely to "break even" each year), modified, 490 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.),
motion for stay of injunction granted, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir.), successive motions to
vacate stay denied, 418 U.S. 911, 419 U.S. 802, 420 U.S. 1000 (1974), aff'd sub nom.
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). For a general discussion of
inadequate capitalization as a factor in disregard law, see Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1051 (1959).
57. In support of its decision to pierce, the court merely reviewed the capitalization
facts and then held that the subsidiary was the "mere agency" of the defendant. See
Erickson v. Minnesota & Ont. Power Co., 134 Minn. 209, 214, 158 N.W. 979, 981 (1916).
58. See Ahlm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 263-64, 143 N.W.2d 65, 68-69 (1966). But see
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Dupuy & Dupuy Developers, Inc., 227 So. 2d 265, 269 (La. Ct. App.
1969) (inadequate capitalization alone not sufficient evidence of fraud).
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4. Shareholder Dominance
Many early Minnesota corporate disregard cases emphasize the dominance exercised over the corporation by the defendant shareholder."9
Some even suggest that dominance alone can be a basis for imposing
personal liability upon shareholders, 0 although these cases normally
involve fraud as well as shareholder dominance." The shareholder dominance factor is an elusive one, especially in the close-corporation setting,
for the close corporation invariably is dominated by its shareholders.2
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized this in a relatively recent
decision, Ahlm v. Rooney,13 where it held that shareholder dominance
of a close corporation, without fraud, was not a sufficient basis for imposing shareholder liability. The court recognized that the corporation
was completely dominated by the defendant shareholder, but stated this
was a phenomenon inherent in closely held corporations." In light of
Ahlm, dominance rightfully should play a minimal role in most future
Minnesota corporate disregard cases."
5. Parent-Subsidiaryand Affiliated Corporations
The limited liability principle is designed primarily to benefit individual shareholders, and therefore the policies favoring limited liability
probably are not as strong in cases involving subsidiary or affiliated
corporations." For this reason, the courts often are more willing to pierce
the corporate veil if the shareholder is a corporation. 7
59. See, e.g., Central Motors & Supply Co. v. Brown, 219 Minn. 467, 469-70, 18 N.W.2d
236, 237 (1945); Lake Park Dev. Co. v. Paul Steenberg Constr. Co., 201 Minn. 396, 399400, 276 N.W. 651, 653-54 (1937); Walsh v. Mankato Oil Co., 201 Minn. 58, 61-62, 275
N.W. 377, 379 (1937); Minneapolis Civic & Commerce Ass'n v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.,
134 Minn. 169, 176-77, 158 N.W. 817, 819-20 (1916), aff'd, 247 U.S. 490 (1918).
60. See, e.g., Lake Park Dev. Co. v. Paul Steenberg Constr. Co., 201 Minn. 396, 398400, 276 N.W. 651, 652-54 (1937); Walsh v. Mankato Oil Co., 201 Minn. 58, 62, 275 N.W.
377, 379 (1937). Disregard involving shareholder dominance of a corporation frequently is
labelled the "instrumentality" rule. Dobbyn, supra note 12, at 186.
61. See cases cited in note 60 supra.
62. See Kramer, Symposium-The Close Corporation-Foreword,18 L. & CoNTEMP.
PROa. 433, 433 (1953); cf. Note, Judicial Supervision of the One Man Corporation, 45
HARv. L. Ray. 1084, 1086 (1932) (dominance standard means little in sole shareholder
corporation context; courts will either pierce veil or respect it depending upon the result
desired).
63. 274 Minn. 259, 143 N.W.2d 65 (1966).
64. Id. at 264, 143 N.W.2d at 69.
65. See notes 186-93 infra and accompanying text.

66. See E.

LArrN, SUBSIDIARIES AND AvI)uATr

CORPORATIONS

196 (1936); Comment,

Alternative Methods of Piercing the Corporate Veil in Contract and Tort Cases, 48 B.U.
L. REY. 123, 136 (1968) (limited liability specifically designed to protect personal fortunes).
67. See H. HENN, supra note 1, §§ 147-148 (absent illegitimate purposes, individual
shareholders must observe two requirements to retain recognition of corporateness; subsidiary or affiliated corporations must observe five); E. Lxry, supra note 66, at 194-95;
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It is clear that a parent or control corporation's complete stock ownership in a subsidiary or affiliate is not sufficient alone to pierce the
corporate veil. 8 Beyond this principle, the Minnesota court's treatment
of parent-subsidiary or affiliated corporations in disregard cases has not
been consistent. In Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario Power Co.," discussed earlier,70 the court held the parent corporation liable for the tort
of its inadequately capitalized subsidiary. Similarly, the court in Specht
v. Missouri Pacific Railroad7 held the parent liable for the subsidiary's
tort because both corporations were part of the same business enterprise. In neither Erickson nor Specht did the court indicate fraud was a
prerequisite to the imposition of shareholder liability upon the parent
corporations. In the more recent case of Di Re v. Central Livestock
Order Buying Co.," however, the court stated emphatically that "[in
the absence of a claim and showing of fraud or other wrongful purposes,
the subsidiary must be treated as a legal entity separate and apart from
the parent.7''3 Thus, Di Re could be viewed as altering any implications
from the previous Erickson and Specht decisions, especially because the
court's language in Di Re is much more specific than in Erickson or
Specht. Yet the cases might be distinguished on the basis that Di Re
was not a tort-creditor case while Erickson and Specht did involve tort
Hamilton, The CorporateEntity, 49 Tax. L. Rav. 979, 992 (1971); Note, supra note 53, at
872 n.1 (liability more limited when shareholder is not a corporation). But see Horowitz,
Disregardingthe Entity of Private Corporations,14 WAsH. L. REv. 285, 293 (1939) (corporate entity more frequently disregarded when shareholder is individual rather than corporation). Some commentators reject the view that parent and control corporations should
be treated differently, apparently on the rationale that the individual shareholders of the
parent or control corporation suffer economic loss by the parent or control corporation's
payment. See, e.g., 11 ARK. L. REv. 450 (1957); 56 MIcH. L. REv. 299, 300 n.5 (1957). For
a general discussion of parent-subsidiary disregard in cases involving contracts and torts,
see Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 1102 (1971) (liability of corporation for contracts of subsidiary);
Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1343 (1966) (liability of corporation for torts of subsidiary).
68. See, e.g., State v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 133 Minn. 413, 415-16, 158 N.W. 627, 628
(1916).
69. 134 Minn. 209, 158 N.W. 979 (1916).
70. See notes 54-57 supra and accompanying text.
71. 154 Minn. 314, 191 N.W. 905 (1923). InSpecht, a subsidiary was formed to avoid a
large filing fee demanded by the state of Nebraska in which the railroad system was
operating. An employee of the subsidiary was injured in Nebraska by a defective railroad
car owned by the parent corporation. However, an agreement between the parent and its
subsidiary provided that possession of all equipment entering Nebraska would pass to the
subsidiary at the state line. The court held that the subsidiary was a mere agent of the
parent. Id. at 320-21, 191 N.W. at 907-08.
72. 246 Minn. 279, 74 N.W.2d 518 (1956). In Di Re, the plaintiff was laid off by a
subsidiary but was told that there was a position open for him with the parent corporation.
Plaintiff refused the offer largely because the position was not consistent with his past
training and skills. When plaintiff sought unemployment compensation, the subsidiary
refused the claim, contending that the two corporations should be deemed to be a single
employer and therefore the new position was merely a transfer. The court rejected the
subsidiary's argument.
73. Id. at 284, 74 N.W.2d at 523.
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creditors. This distinction can be justified on the rationale, discussed in
greater detail elsewhere in this Note,' that tort creditors normally do
not have the opportunity to investigate the financial stability of the
subsidiary. On the other hand, the Di Re court may have been reacting
narrowly to the shareholders' attempt in that case to pierce because
corporate entities rarely are disregarded for the benefit of shareholders."
Thus, Minnesota disregard law in the area of multiple corporations
must be considered unsettled.
B. In re Will of Clarke-A Conceptual Modification
The previous discussion sets forth the traditional approach taken by
the Minnesota Supreme Court in corporate disregard cases. In a small
number of cases, however, the court has deviated from the traditional
approach and has applied a conceptually different approach. The lead6 deing case applying this different approach is In re Will of Clarke,"
cided in 1939. Clarke involved questionable dividend payments made
by a corporation, the stock of which constituted the corpus of a trust.
The trustee also was the life beneficiary of the trust, and as trustee she
caused the corporation to make large dividend payments to herself as
life beneficiary of the trust. Remainder beneficiaries objected to the
trustee's questionable activities and sought to have her adjudged personally liable. The trustee denied liability, contending that the corporate entity was responsible for the excessive dividend policy. The Clarke
court used this opportunity to embark on a basically philosophical discussion of the corporate disregard doctrine. The court emphasized that
a corporation is not a legal fiction but rather is a real legal person and
as such can never be disregarded." Although holding the trustee person74. See notes 151-93 infra and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., In re Penn. Cent. Sec. Litigation, 355 F. Supp. 1026, 1035 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
Shipp v. Bell & Ross Enterprises, Inc., 256 Ark. 89, 97-98, 505 S.W.2d 509, 515 (1974);
Jonas v. State, 19 Wis. 2d 638, 644, 121 N.W.2d 235, 238-39 (1963).
76. 204 Minn. 574, 284 N.W. 876 (1939).
77. This distinction has long been debated in Minnesota law. Although the corporation
is considered an entity separate and distinct from its shareholders, see, e.g., Corcoran v.
P.G. Corcoran Co., 245 Minn. 258, 269, 71 N.W.2d 787, 795 (1955), its conceptual nature
has been subject to dispute. The Minnesota court sometimes has viewed the corporation
as a fiction having no existence independent of statute. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Germania
Brewing Co., 53 Minn. 214, 218, 54 N.W. 1115, 1116 (1893). At other times the Minnesota
court has viewed it as an entity having existence independent of statute. See, e.g., Matthews v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 215 Minn. 369, 373, 10 N.W.2d 230, 232 (1943). The
Clarke court adopted the latter theory which apparently was central to the rationale that
liability should be placed directly on the wrongdoer involved. The court's analysis probably would not have suffered, however, had the court viewed the entity as a fiction instead
of an independent entity. See I. WoRmsEm, DisRwam OF THE CoRpoRATE FicTION AND
ALm CORPORATION PROBLEMs 43 (1927) (nature of corporate entity is a tempting but
profitless discussion, more metaphysical than legal).
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ally liable, the court offered the following rationale as a substitute for
traditional disregard analysis: 8
Many cases present avowed disregard of corporate entity.... But
they all come to just this-courts simply will not let interposition of
corporate entity or action prevent a judgment otherwise required. Corporate presence and action no more than those of an individual will bar
a remedy demanded by law in application to facts.. . .The method

neither pierces any veil nor goes beyond any obstruction, save for its
refusal to let one fact bar the judgment which the whole sum of facts
requires.
For such reasons, we feel that the method of decision known as
"piercing the corporate veil" or "disregarding the corporate entity"
unnecessarily complicates decision. It is dialectically ornate and correctly guides understanding, but over a circuitous and unrealistic trail.
The objective is more easily attainable over the direct and unencumbered route followed herein.
The Clarke reasoning provides a viable alternative to traditional disregard analysis. The court's point was a simple one: if an individual's
fraudulent or inequitable activities, even if done on behalf of a corporation, indicate the individual should assume personal liability for his
activities, then the individual should be held liable personally regardless
of the existence of the corporate entity."
To a large extent, the distinction between Clarke and the more traditional approach is semantical, but Clarke also represents a shift in emphasis. Under Clarke, the activities of the individual defendant are
scrutinized rather than those of the corporation. This shift in emphasis
also could cause a shift in result. The result under traditional disregard
analysis normally is to treat the corporation as a partnership and hold
all shareholders liable as partners, even if some shareholders were not
parties to the fraud or injustice." The Clarke approach, however, would
result in liability only to those persons who were parties to the fraud or
injustice, a result arguably more defensible than that of the traditional
corporate disregard approach."' Because the Minnesota court has followed both approaches in its allocation of liability,'2 it is unclear in
Minnesota who should be held liable upon disregard.
78. 204 Minn. at 578-79, 284 N.W. at 878-79.
79. For a similar view, see Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity
Theory, 17 COLUM. L. REv. 128 (1917).
80. See, e.g., Manufacturers Bldg., Inc. v. Heller, 306 Minn. 180, 235 N.W.2d 825
(1975), noted in 3 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 293 (1977); 1 W. FizrcHER, supra note 8, § 41.3.
81. See Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 815, 821-22
1976); 12 U. MIAMI L. Rv.122 (1957) (criticizing decision holding shareholder
(N.D. Ill.
liable who was not a director of the corporation and who had not participated in any
fraud).
82. Compare In re Will of Clarke, 204 Minn. 574, 577-79, 284 N.W. 876, 878-79 (1939)
with Manufacturers Bldg., Inc. v. Heller, 306 Minn. 180, 183, 235 N.W.2d 825, 827 (1975).
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If the Clarke rationale has any shortcoming it is that sufficient deference may not be given to the principle of limited shareholder liability.
The standards promulgated in Clarke are vague and, if followed, possibly could result in shareholder liability to an extent that might undermine the utility of incorporation, especially for small businesses.U This
shortcoming could be avoided if fraud or injustice on the part of the
shareholder was still required as a prerequisite to liability."
The present status of the Clarke approach is uncertain. At infrequent
intervals the court will cite Clarke and apply its reasoning instead of
following more traditional Minnesota corporate disregard concepts.u In
other cases, the court ignores the Clarke rationale and speaks in terms
of disregarding the corporate entity or piercing the corporate veil.8" The
Minnesota court's failure to identify which of these conceptually different approaches (with potentially different results) should control represents one of the major uncertainties in Minnesota corporate disregard
law.87
C. Related Theories
The Minnesota Supreme Court and most other courts have developed
several theories of law that either supplement or in appropriate cases
supplant the corporate disregard theory." The primary related theories
are agency, estoppel, and fraudulent conveyances law.
83. See Horowitz, supra note 67, at 288 n.18 (in Clarke the court rejected the disregard

doctrine but substituted an equally unsatisfactory standard because of its vagueness).
84. Clarke'sfoundation, of course, was a form of fraud; the trustee wrongfully appropriated trust funds to her own use and to the detriment of remainder beneficiaries. The court
since Clarke has suggested that fraud is a requirement under the Clarke rationale. See
General Underwriters, Inc. v. Kline, 233 Minn. 345, 349-50, 46 N.W.2d 794, 797 (1951).
85. See Milwaukee Motor Transp. Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 292 Minn. 66, 7173, 193 N.W.2d 605, 608-09 (1971); Corcoran v. P.G. Corcoran Co., 245 Minn. 258, 269, 71
N.W.2d 787, 795 (1955); Lenhart v. Lenhart Wagon Co., 210 Minn. 164, 169-70, 298 N.W.
37, 40 (1941).
86. See Ahlm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 263-64, 143 N.W.2d 65, 68-69 (1966); Di Re v.
Central Livestock Order Buying Co., 246 Minn. 279, 284, 74 N.W.2d 518, 523 (1956);
Central Motors & Supply Co. v. Brown, 219 Minn. 467, 469-70, 18 N.W.2d 236, 237 (1945);
Erickson-Hellekson-Vye Co. v. A. Wells Co., 217 Minn. 361, 381-82, 15 N.W.2d 162, 173
(1944). But see General Underwriters, Inc. v. Kline, 233 Minn. 345, 349-50, 46 N.W.2d
794, 797 (1951) (traditional disregard analysis; Clarke cited); Country Club Dist. Serv. Co.
v. Village of Edina, 214 Minn. 26, 35, 8 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1943) (same).
87. In 24 MINN. L. REv. 107, 109 (1939) the writer suggested that the Minnesota Supreme Court in Clarke apparently "paved the way for a clearer understanding" of the
relationship between corporations and their shareholders. Because the Minnesota court
has cited both the Clarke theory and traditional disregard theory in support of its shareholder liability decisions, this appeal apparently has not been heeded.
88. See generally Note, Liability of a Corporationfor Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate,
71 I-Lsv. L. REv. 1122, 1123-25 (1958) (noncorporatebases of shareholder liability).
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1. Agency
Courts are fond of stating that a corporate entity can be disregarded
because it was acting as an agent for its shareholders." Often when the
courts refer to a corporation as a "mere agent" for its shareholders the
agency language is used as a metaphor like "alter ego" or "instrumentality" and is not intended to represent a strict application of agency
principles. 0 It is wrong to refer to the application of agency principles
as a method of disregarding a corporate entity; rather, agency law and
corporate disregard law should be considered as distinct legal theories
available
for imposing shareholder liability."
Occasionally,
however, a corporation does act as an agent for
its
shareholders. When this ground for imposing shareholder liability is
available, it probably is a sound and preferable basis for imposing liability because agency law has relatively clear and well-developed standards. 2 A finding of agency obviates the need to consider the applicability of the corporate disregard theory, and reference to agency as a basis
for disregarding a corporate entity merely confuses the analysis." Thus,
89. See, e.g., Manufacturers Bldg., Inc. v. Heller, 306 Minn. 180, 235 N.W.2d 825
(1975); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. A. Enkema Holding Co., 196 Minn. 154, 157-58,
264 N.W. 576, 578 (1936); cf. Erickson v. Minnesota & Ont. Power Co., 134 Minn. 209,
214, 158 N.W. 979, 981 (1916) (corporation may be agent of control corporation).
90. For example, a federal court stated in New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 F. 668,
673 (6th Cir. 1918), aff'd on second appeal sub non. Wheeling & L.E.R.R. v. Carpenter,
264 F. 772 (6th Cir. 1920):
The District Court used the word "agency" as a synonym of "adjunct," whatever that may mean, and as descriptive of a relation variously defined in the
cases as "adjunct," "branch," "instrumentality," "dummy," "buffer," and
"tool," but all in the sense of "means" through which a corporation's own
business is actively prosecuted; or of the relation created when two corporations
are in substance identical though operating under different names.
91. See Northern Nat. Gas Co. v. Superior Ct., 64 Cal. App. 3d 992, 994, 134 Cal. Rptr.
850, 857 (1976) (liability under agency principles predicated on scope of agent's authority;
agent's existence never disregarded as in application of piercing principles); Lowendahl
v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 247 App. Div. 144, 156, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 74-75, aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360,
6 N.E.2d 56 (1936); Latty, The CorporateEntity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 MICH.
L. REv. 597, 611 (1936) ("it is hardly worthwhile torturing 'agency' to save 'entity' ");
Wang, supra note 19, at 349 (if corporation is separate from shareholders, it cannot become
an agent except through express or implied contract). But see Ballantine, SeparateEntity
of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CALtF. L. REv. 12, 21 (1925) (sole shareholder
liability for acts of corporation better explained by agency than disregard principles).
92. See New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 F. 668, 673 (6th Cir. 1918) ("if a corporation is the agent of another . . . through which the other, as principal ....
carries on
business, the liability of the principal will be ascertained through principles of law wellknown and long-established"), aff'd second appeal sub nom. Wheeling & L.E.R.R. v.
Carpenter, 264 F. 772 (6th Cir. 1920); Elvalsons v. Industrial Covers, Inc., 269 Or. 441,
452, 525 P.2d 105, 111 (1974); Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 1102, 1116-19 (1971). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958).
93. See, e.g., Note, Piercing the CorporateVeil in Louisiana,22 Loy. L. Rav. 993, 1000
(1976).
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the courts should guard against using agency law as a guise for imposing
shareholder liability in cases where the facts indicate the corporation
was not acting as an agent for its shareholders.
2. Estoppel
An additional concept that may be relevant to the shareholder liability question is that of equitable estoppel. An estoppel arises when a person's conduct precludes him from asserting a right which he might otherwise have asserted because another person in good faith has relied
detrimentally upon such conduct.' The doctrine of estoppel has broad
application in the shareholder liability area and can be used both by and
against the person attempting to pierce the corporate veil."5
Estoppel can be utilized on behalf of the plaintiff in cases where he
did not know he was dealing with a corporation but instead believed he
was contracting with the shareholder directly.96 For example, the Minnesota court has found individual liability in cases where individuals
incorporated during a course of dealing with the plaintiff creditor. 7 If
the creditor was unaware of the incorporation and thought he was still
dealing with individuals, and those individuals did not inform him otherwise, they will be individually liable to the creditor." A variation of
this principle is found in Roberts v. Americana Nursing Homes, Inc.,19
where plaintiff creditor obtained a judgment against defendant corporation and commenced garnishment proceedings. An affiliated corporation of the defendant intervened to assert that the funds sought by the
plaintiff belonged to it, notwithstanding that the defendant possessed
the funds. The court held the intervenor was estopped from asserting the
separateness of the corporations because it had led the plaintiff to believe that the defendant owned the funds. When the intervenor argued
that the court should not disregard the corporate entities involved, the
court corrrectly noted that the doctrine of disregard was not applicable
because the case was being decided on estoppel grounds."'
The estoppel doctrine also can be utilized against the plaintiff credi94. See Del Hayes & Sons v. Mitchell, 304 Minn. 275, 281-86, 230 N.W.2d 588,
592-95 (1975) (distinguishing promissory estoppel from equitable estoppel), noted in 3
WM. MrrcHELu L. Rxv. 276 (1977); Lundberg v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 299 Minn. 46,
50-51, 216 N.W.2d 121, 124 (1974).
95. See generally 1 W. FLE-'cHER, supra note 8, § 47.
96. See id. The same estoppel applies where creditors are misled as to which corporate
debtor of a multiple-corporation enterprise they are dealing with. See, e.g., June v. Vibra
Screw Feeders, Inc., 6 Mich. App. 484, 489, 149 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1967); Roberts v.
Americana Nursing Homes, Inc., 293 Minn. 388, 196 N.W.2d 296 (1972) (per curiam);
Stauffer v. Isaly Dairy Co., 4 Ohio App. 2d 15, 27-28, 211 N.E.2d 72, 80 (1965).
97. See Johnson Bros. Oil Co. v. Chies, 293 Minn. 363, 199 N.W.2d 441 (1972).
98. Id.; accord, e.g., S. Davis, Inc. v. McGuckin, 51 Misc. 2d 1071, 274 N.Y.S.2d 1007
(City Ct. 1966).
99. 293 Minn. 388, 196 N.W.2d 296 (1972) (per curiam).
100. Id. at 390, 196 N.W.2d at 297-98.
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tor. The most prevalent situation is when the creditor is aware that he
is dealing with a corporation and the shareholders have not misrepresented the financial condition of the corporation.' In this situation,
especially if the shareholders had refused to or were not requested to
guaranty the debt individually, the court is likely to find that the creditor is estopped from asserting the shareholders are individually liable for
the debt.' 2 Thus, estoppel principles can be of value to defendant shareholders as well as plaintiff creditors.
3. Fraudulent Conveyances
A final area related to shareholder liability is fraudulent conveyances
law. Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, a creditor of the
transferor can have a conveyance set aside in three basic situations:
first, where the transfer was made with actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud the creditors of the transferor; 03 second, where the transferor
was insolvent at the time of the conveyance or was rendered insolvent
by the conveyance and the transfer was made for less than fair consider0 and third, where the transfer was made for less than fair considation;'1
eration by a business left with an unreasonably small amount of assets. 05 Consequently, for example, if an insolvent corporation transfers
assets to its shareholders for less than market value, corporate creditors
can have that transfer voided.'" Conversely, if an insolvent shareholder
transfers assets to his corporation for less than market value, creditors
of the shareholder can have the transfer set aside.'10 Fraudulent conveyances law, of course, is distinct from corporate disregard law. The Minnesota court in the past, however, occasionally has intermingled the two
theories.'" This intermingling is unfortunate because fraudulent conveyances law is a specific statutory form of relief with definite standards
and requirements, and it does not necessarily involve the disregard of
any corporate entity. Therefore, the failure to distinguish the two theories only serves to render both more confusing.'"
101. See generally Comment, Estoppel to Deny Corporate Existence, 31 TzNN. L. Rzv.
336 (1964).
102. See Win. Mueller & Sons v. Chanhassen Redi Mix, 273 Minn. 214, 220, 140 N.W.2d
326, 330 (1966); State v. Rivers, 206 Minn. 85, 95, 287 N.W. 790, 794-95 (1939); Northern
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Witherow, 205 Minn. 413, 415-16, 286 N.W. 397, 398 (1939); Kingsley v. English, 202 Minn. 258, 261, 278 N.W. 154, 156 (1938); Richards v. Minnesota Say.
Bank, 75 Minn. 196, 206, 77 N.W. 822, 824 (1899).
103. MINN. STAT. § 513.26 (1976).
104. Id. § 513.23 ("balance sheet" insolvency); id. § 513.25 (equity insolvency).
105. Id. § 513.24.
106. See, e.g., Advance Dry Wall Co. v. Wolfe-Gilchrist, Inc., 53 Mich. App. 215, 218
N.W.2d 866 (1974); 3 WM. Mrrcmu L. REv. 287 (1977).
107. See, e.g., Rose v. Rose, 241 App. Div. 3, 4-5, 271 N.Y.S. 5, 7-8 (1934).
108. See, e.g., General Underwriters, Inc. v. Kline, 233 Minn. 345, 46 N.W.2d 794
(1951); Matchan v. Phoenix Land Inv. Co., 159 Minn. 132, 198 N.W. 417 (1924).
109. It is important to distinguish the fraudulent conveyances and corporate disregard
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The present shortcomings of Minnesota corporate disregard law cannot fairly be said to be severe or the fault of the Minnesota Supreme
Court. The court's strong and relatively consistent emphasis on fraud
indicates that it has maintained a healthy and necessary respect for the
separateness of corporate entities, permitting disregard of corporate entities only when necessary to avoid fraud or injustice." 0 Moreover, the
court's decision refusing to pierce in the close-corporation setting merely
because of dominance by the shareholders indicates the court is sensitive to the reality that valid small corporations inevitably are dominated
by their shareholders."' The shortcomings that do exist can be attributed primarily to the fact that the court has not had the opportunity in
recent years to draw distinctions that probably should be drawn in this
area. For example, it probably is sound to distinguish between tort and
contract creditors, for the former normally have no opportunity to investigate the solvency of the debtor corporation while the latter, contract
creditors, generally can investigate before contracting.", Similarly, inadequate capitalization quite arguably should be a major factor in deciding whether to disregard a corporate entity, for as a matter of public
policy, shareholders should be required to give the corporation sufficient
capital to pay reasonably foreseeable debts, at least with regard to potential tort liabilities." 3 Finally, it might be proper to distinguish
parent-subsidiary and affiliated corporation cases from noncorporate
shareholder cases on the rationale that corporate shareholders deserve
less protection through limited liability than do individual shareholders." 4 The Minnesota Supreme Court has made none of these distinctions, primarily because it has not been presented with cases in which
these distinctions should have been made.
Some of the present shortcomings of Minnesota corporate disregard
law, however, are attributable directly to Minnesota Supreme Court
decisions. The uncertain status of In re Will of Clarke,"5 which purported to eliminate the disregard theory in Minnesota,"' is a major
theories because of the differences in result that apply. When a fraudulent conveyance is
set aside, the creditor's remedy is only against the asset transferred. When the corporate
entity is disregarded, the creditor's remedy is against all of the shareholder's nonexempt
assets. See Comment, Theory of the Corporate Entity and the One-Man Corporationin
Louisiana, 38 TULANE L. Rlv. 738, 743 (1964).
110. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
111. See Ahlm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 264, 143 N.W.2d 65, 69 (1966).
112. For a discussion of this distinction, see notes 151-93 infra and accompanying text.
113. For a discussion of the appropriate role of inadequate capitalization in disregard
law, see notes 153-54, 164-85 infra and accompanying text.
114. For a discussion of the special role of multiple-corporation structures in disregard
law, see notes 189-93 infra and accompanying text.
115. 204 Minn. 574, 284 N.W. 876 (1939).
116. See notes 76-87 supra and accompanying text.
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example. The court also has failed to explain justifiable deviations it has
made from the traditional fraud approach. For example, in the 1976 case
of ManufacturersBuilding, Inc. v. Heller,"' a corporate veil was pierced
without a finding of fraud." 8 The court failed to distinguish the facts of
Heller, which involved a dispute among the shareholders, from cases
involving third-party creditors. Heller, therefore, raises the issue of
whether a corporate entity can be disregarded without a showing of
fraud in cases involving corporate creditors."' Similarly, the court's occasional failure to distinguish agency and fraudulent conveyances principles from the disregard doctrine has created confusion. 2 1 Consequently, although the Minnesota Supreme Court's emphasis on fraud is
generally sound, Minnesota corporate disregard law is in need of clarification and, in some instances, change.
DE.

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES

Most courts have done little toward developing a coherent set of principles to govern the disregard of corporate entities. "' However, some
courts and commentators have suggested alternatives to the vague standards presently applied by most courts. This section will discuss some
of the noteworthy examples of those alternatives.
A.

The Metaphor Approach

Corporate disregard law is laden with judicial pronouncements of
metaphors that, in many cases, seem to serve as the basis for shareholder liability. "Alter ego,' 22 "instrumentality," ' or any of the other
piercing metaphors 2 accomplish this result. The purpose of the meta117. 306 Minn. 180, 235 N.W.2d 825 (1975), noted in 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 293
(1977).
118. In Heller, the court found no evidence of fraud or unfair dealing. See 306 Minn. at
183, 235 N.W.2d at 827.
119. See 3 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 293, 294-95 (1977).
120. See notes 89-93, 103-09 supra and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Swanson v. Levy, 509 F.2d 859, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1975) (test of piercing
the corporate veil has rarely been articulated with any clarity); Hanson Sw. Corp. v. DalMac Constr. Co., 554 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (much confusion exists over
the criteria necessary for disregarding the corporate entity). See generally Wang, supra
note 19.
122. E.g., General Underwriters, Inc. v. Kline, 233 Minn. 345, 346, 46 N.W.2d 794, 796
(1951).
123. E.g., State v. McBride, 215 Minn. 123, 130, 9 N.W.2d 416, 420 (1943).
124. See United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 16 (D. Minn.) ("mere
instrumentality or agent"), modified, 490 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.), motion for stay of injunction
granted, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir.), successive motions to vacate stay denied, 418 U.S. 911,
419 U.S. 802, 420 U.S' 1000 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d
492 (8th Cir. 1975); Manufacturers Bldg., Inc. v. Heller, 306 Minn. 180, 181, 235 N.W.2d
825, 826 (1975) ("agent or conduit"); Whitney v. Leighton, 225 Minn. 1, 7, 30 N.W.2d 329,
332-33 (1947) ("tool"), aff'd on rehearing, 225 Minn. 12, 30 N.W.2d 335 (1948); Country
Club Dist. Serv. Co. v. Village of Edina, 214 Minn. 26, 35, 8 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1943)
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phor policy ostensibly is to point to some improper relation between the
shareholders and the corporation that serves as the basis for disregard.'25
What is important to the piercing decision, however, is not the selection
of a guideless metaphor but rather is the shareholder conduct and nature of the claim involved in the case. 2 ' Metaphors add nothing but
confusion to the analysis and therefore should be avoided. 7
B.

The California Approach
2

The California courts, I and courts in other jurisdictions following the
California lead,"' have created a fixed standard by which to evaluate
corporate disregard cases. Sometimes labelled the "alter ego" rule,'
these courts will pierce a corporate veil where two facts have been established: (1) such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its shareholders that the individuality of the corporation has
ceased, and (2) the observance of the entity would sanction a fraud or
("hollow legal shell"); State v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 110 Minn. 415, 433, 126 N.W.
126, 129 (1910) (mere "cloak"). Professor Henn found 37 metaphors in common use. See
H. HEN, supra note 1, at 250 n.2.
125. See Dobbyn, supra note 12, at 187 (common denominator of metaphor approach
is concern for the relationship between shareholder and corporation).
126. In Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94,155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926), Judge Cardozo
recognized the evil of the metaphor approach in the parent-subsidiary corporations context: "The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corporations is
one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to be narrowly
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."
127. The court in Hanson Sw. Corp. v. Dal-Mac Constr. Co., 554 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1977) stated:
Much confusion exists in determining the criteria for disregarding the corporate
entity. This confusion exists partially because of the words used to describe the
condition. Courts have used such terms as "dummy," "sham," "instrumentality," "agency," "adjunct," "tool," "device," and "business conduit,"
to name a few. What these words mean relative to the fact situation of the case
is elusive.
Accord, Ballantine, supra note 91, at 18 (metaphors are too uncertain to be adopted as a
test or rule of law); Fuller, supra note 6, at 1378-79 (metaphors often obscure the real
issues involved). But see Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 322 (1939)
(metaphors do not comprise a rule but rather merely designate the broader equitable
principle that corporate entity will be disregarded when used to accomplish fraud or
injustice).
128. See, e.g., Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 579, 364 P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr.
641, 643 (1961) (in bank); Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 2d 574, 580, 335 P.2d 107, 110-11
(1959); Minifie v. Rowley, 187 Cal. 481, 487, 202 P. 673, 676 (1921).
129. See Dietel v. Day, 16 Ariz. App. 206, 208, 492 P.2d 455, 457 (1972); Farmers
Warehouse, Inc. v. Collins, 220 Ga. 141, 150, 137 S.E.2d 619, 625 (1964); Surety Life Ins.
Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 599, 601, 514 P.2d 594, 596 (1973); Ampex
Corp. v. Office Elec., Inc., 24 Ill. App. 3d 21, 24, 320 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1974); Kilpatrick
Bros. v. Poynter, 205 Kan. 787, 796-97, 473 P.2d 33, 42 (1970); Plotkin v. National Lead
Co., 87 Nev. 51, 52, 482 P.2d 323, 324 (1971).
130. See Schifferman, The Alter Ego, 32 J. ST. B. CAUF. 143 (1947).
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promote injustice.13"' To satisfy the first requirement, the plaintiff creditor ordinarily must prove the shareholder dominated the corporation
and failed to observe corporate formalities, thus indicating the shareholders did not treat the corporation as a separate entity.' The rationale of the two-tiered California approach appears to be that when the
shareholders have not treated the corporation as a separate entity and,
moreover, have used the entity as an instrument to perpetrate fraud or
injustice, then the policies favoring incorporation are outweighed by
those favoring compensation for creditors. 3 '
The California approach bears strong resemblance to present Minnesota law, especially with regard to the fraud or injustice requirement.',
The two-tier test might indicate that the second requirement, fraud, is
insufficient by itself to pierce in California; thus, the creditor's burden
would be greater there than in Minnesota. However, the facts in most
Minnesota cases permitting corporate disregard indicate that the first
requirement, unity of interest and ownership, also has been present. '3
The creditor's burden in California, therefore, probably is not any
greater than in Minnesota. In fact, the courts following the California
rule have shown a marked willingness to employ the remedy. 3 '
The advantage of the California approach is that it provides some
certainty to the application of the disregard doctrine and articulates the
relevant conduct and policies involved rather than relying on vague
metaphors. 37 Its disadvantage is that it fails to distinguish among various fact situations, such as tort and contract cases'3' and cases involving
parent-subsidiary and affiliated corporations, 3' that arguably should be
131. For an extensive review of facts relevant to satisfy the California approach, see
Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 838-40, 26 Cal. Rptr.
806, 813-15 (1962).
132. See, e.g., Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 2d 574, 580, 335 P.2d 107, 111 (1959);
Claremont Press Pub. Co. v. Barksdale, 187 Cal. App. 2d 813, 816, 10 Cal. Rptr. 214, 216
(1960).
133. See Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d 386, 397, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (1972)
(purpose of disregard doctrine not to protect every unsatisfied creditor; only where shareholders' bad faith conduct prevents payment will entity be disregarded).
134. In California, nonpayment of creditors through financial inability is not, without
more, an inequitable result justifying disregard of the corporate entity. 30 S. CAL. L. REv.
538, 539 (1957). This approach is consistent with present Minnesota law. See Whitney v.
Leighton, 225 Minn. 1, 8, 30 N.W.2d 329, 333 (1947) (must prove fraud), aff'd on rehearing,
225 Minn. 12, 30 N.W.2d 335 (1948).
135. See cases cited in note 33 supra.
136. See 2 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 751, at 138 n.18 (Supp.
1968); 30 S. CAL. L. Rav. 538, 538 (1957) (many cases in which veil has been pierced under
the broad California rule). The California courts are considered to be on the "forefront"
of disregard cases involving inadequate capitalization. See Comment, supra note 66, at
136.
137. See Platt v. Billingsley, 234 Cal. App. 2d 577, 582, 44 Cal. Rptr. 476, 480 (1965)
(long line of cases has established two criteria for piercing the corporate veil in California).
138. For a discussion of this distinction, see notes 151-93 infra and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of this distinction, see notes 189-93 infra and accompanying text.
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treated differently. The California approach, however, would improve
present Minnesota law to the extent that it sets specific standards to be
applied in most corporate disregard cases without radically changing the
substance or flexibility of existing Minnesota law.
C.

The Enterprise Entity Theory

Proposed by Adolph Berle in 1947,140 the enterprise entity theory of
shareholder liability departs drastically from traditional disregard concepts. The theory applies to cases involving parent-subsidiary or affiliated corporation cases where business enterprises often are fragmented.
Conceptually, the theory is quite simple. If one underlying business
enterprise is composed of more than one corporate entity, then the entire
enterprise should be held responsible for the liabilities of each component corporation."' The classic New York taxi cases provide a vivid
example for the application of Berle's theory." 2 To minimize loss from
foreseeable liabilities, individual taxis were separately incorporated as
affiliates of a control corporation. Thus, if a taxi was involved in a
serious accident, any payment for resulting liabilities was limited to the
assets of the particular affiliate, typically a minimal amount, and the
assets of the entire enterprise thereby were protected. Berle would ignore
the separate components and hold the entire enterprise liable." '
The enterprise entity theory is antithetical to traditional disregard
theory"' and other corporate law principles which normally allow the
140. See Berle, The Theory of EnterpriseEntity, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 343 (1947).
141. Id. at 354.
142. See, e.g., Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd sub nor. Mull v.
Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1966); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223
N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1966); Mangan v. Terminal Transp. Sys., Inc., 247 App. Div.
853, 286 N.Y.S. 666 (1936). See generally Note, Piercing the Taxi Medallion, 19 N.Y.U.
INTPA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
143. See Berle, supra note 140, at 354. In Specht v. Missouri P. R.R., 154 Minn. 314,
191 N.W. 905 (1923) the Minnesota Supreme Court seemed to apply a rationale similar
to the enterprise entity theory. To avoid a large state filing fee, a railroad incorporated a
subsidiary corporation to do business in that state. The subsidiary apparently was adequately capitalized, formalities were observed, and each corporation had virtually independent management. When an employee of the subsidiary was injured, he sued the
parent and recovered. The court said: "Plainly, this whole railroad is one entity. The
[subsidiary] corporation is a mere subsidiary agency of the defendant for carrying on the
Nebraska section of this composite whole." Id. at 320, 191 N.W. at 907.
144. See Ballantine, supra note 91, at 17 ("Even when two or more corporations are
associated together under common control as several branches or departments of a single
common enterprise, they are still normally to be regarded as separate and independent
legal entities."). The enterprise entity theory essentially collapses multiple-corporate
structures into a single enterprise for liability purposes and thereby implicitly disregards
the separate identities of all the corporations involved. This approach to corporate disregard conflicts with the general rules that multiple corporations are considered separate
and distinct entities, see, e.g., Di Re v. Central Livestock Order Buying Co., 246 Minn.
279, 283, 74 N.W.2d 518, 523 (1956), and that sole stock ownership of one corporation by
another does not destroy the former's legal entity, see, e.g., Belle City Malleable Iron Co.
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use of complex corporate organizations.' As a result, the theory has not
been widely adopted.' However, Berle's analysis does point to a potentially serious problem: the use of subsidiary and affiliated corporations
can be abusive, especially where they obviously are undercapitalized in
view of their foreseeable liabilities. "' Thus while most courts have been
reluctant to adopt the enterprise entity theory, many of them, invoking
traditional disregard principles, have exhibited a greater tendency to
disregard a subsidiary's or affiliate's corporate status than that of a
corporation owned by individual shareholders.' This tendency would
seem to be sound, for it is more onerous to impose liability on individuals than on a parent corporation whose own shareholders still retain
limited liability (although they admittedly will suffer some financial
loss if the parent is made to pay for the subsidiary's liabilities).'
IV.

SUGGESTED APPROACH

The California and enterprise entity approaches offer valuable contributions to corporate disregard law, but neither is sufficiently comprehensive. The shortcomings of present Minnesota law call for a reevaluation of corporate disregard that draws from the best aspects of these
approaches, present Minnesota law, and suggestions by other commentators. Set forth below is a suggested approach to corporate disregard.
The basic premise of this suggested approach is that the courts should
consider the nature of the claim involved before applying the corporate
disregard remedy. There are essentially two types of creditor's claims:
contract or consensual claims, and tort or nonconsensual claims.I0 Each
v. Clark, 172 Minn. 508, 510, 215 N.W. 855, 856 (1927). See Comment, Disregardingthe
CorporateEntity: Contract Claims, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 464 (1967).
145. See Milwaukee Motor Transp. Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 292 Minn. 66, 7273, 193 N.W.2d 605, 609 (1971) ("There is nothing wrong with the organization of a
subsidiary corporation to carry on a phase of the parent company's operations, and, in
contemplation of law, the liabilities and obligations arising from such transactions between them may be the same as those existing between corporations having no common
relationship.").
146. Hamilton, supra note 67, at 985. But see NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S.
398, 403-04 (1960); Hartford Steam Serv. Co. v. Sullivan, 26 Conn. Sup. 277, 281, 220 A.2d
772, 774 (1966); Block v. Ford Motor Co., 286 A.2d 228, 232-33 n.12 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972)
(court did not use Berle theory but indicated that on proper facts it might).
147. See Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 380, 10 N.E.2d 259, 264 (1937) (not unusual
for creators of subsidiary corporations to capitalize them inadequately and thereby
impede creditors' ability to collect).
148. See E. LArY, supra note 66, at 193-201; Corrigan & Schirott, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Dispelling the Mists of Metaphor, 17 TR. LAw. GUIDE 121, 133 (1973); Hamilton,
supra note 67, at 992.
149. See E. LATrY, supra note 66, at 193-201; Fuller, supra note 6, at 1377 n.13, 1382
(initial insulation against liability involved in individual shareholder case; double insulation involved in parent-subsidiary case).
150. Contract creditors may be considered consensual creditors because they consented
to do business with the corporation. See Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Corn-
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type will be considered separately, followed by a discussion of the allocation of liability among shareholders or others responsible for the loss.
A.

Contract or Consensual Creditors

The consensual creditor normally intends to bargain with the corporation. In the usual case, the freedoms of contract are available during
negotiations, including the opportunity to investigate the financial stability of the corporation and the ability to negotiate for shareholder
guaranty of the obligation.' If the creditor fails to take advantage of
these opportunities, he should be deemed to have done so at his own
risk, especially in view of the widespread understanding of the limited
liability principle.'52 Consequently, evidence of shareholder dominance,
inadequate capitalization, or failure to observe corporate formalities
parties and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 L. & CONTEMP. PiOB. 473, 476 (1953). Tort
creditors, however, may be considered nonconsensual creditors because they presumably
did not consent to be injured and any resulting judgment obtained would be based on the
unwilling nature of the debt. See Note, Disregardingthe CorporateFictionin Florida:The
Need for Specifics, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 175, 177-78 nn.14-15 (1974). The terms "consensual" and "nonconsensual" make clear the rationale of the suggested approach proposed
by this Note and thus are referred to their analogues, "contract" and "tort."
151. See Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 581-82, 227 A.2d 552, 561 (1967) (dissenting
opinion); Obre v. Alban Tractor Co., 228 Md. 291, 296-97, 179 A.2d 861, 863 (1962);
Hanson Sw. Corp. v. Dal-Mac Constr. Co., 554 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977);
Comment, supra note 144, at 442 (consensual creditor normally expected to investigate).
Indeed, a refusal by a creditor to guaranty personally the obligation presents the strongest
case against employment of the corporate disregard remedy. See Hamilton, supra note 67,
at 986.
152. See John S. Westervelt's Sons v. Regency, Inc., 1 N.J. Super. 466, 470, 63 A.2d
818, 820 (Ch. Div. 1948) (if plaintiff wanted to charge defendant shareholders personally,
it should have had them join in the contract), aff'd, 3 N.J. Super. 173, 65 A.2d 776 (App.
Div. 1949), aff'd, 3 N.J. 472, 70 A.2d 767 (1950); Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of
the Delaware and Maryland Close Corporation Statutes, 1968 DUKE L.J. 525, 554 (creditors are risk takers just as shareholders are); Note, One Man Corporations-Scopeand
Limitations, 100 U. PA. L. RPv. 853, 862 (1952). This result is justifiable on several legal
principles. See Hamilton, supra note 67, at 984 (risk assumption); Comment, supra note
144, at 446 (waiver and estoppel).
The writer in Note, Inadequate Capitalizationas a Basis for ShareholderLiability: The
California Approach and a Recommendation, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 823, 837-40 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Inadequate Capitalization: The CaliforniaApproach] would argue
that unless the creditor knew the corporation was in poor financial condition, the consensual creditor's ability to investigate should not serve to deny a remedy against shareholders of an inadequately capitalized corporation in the event of nonpayment because the
limited liability principle was not meant to sanction inadequately capitalized corporations
and creditors should be able to rely on the expectation that their debtor is adequately
capitalized. Shareholders, it is said, are supposed to bear the risk of corporate failure, not
creditors. This see-no-evil approach unfairly benefits the consensual creditor. See Note,
supra note 88, at 1128 (insolvency of a corporation is a risk creditors are normally required
to bear). The reliance of the approach on a presumption of initial adequate capitalization
finds no support in the corporation statutes and probably does not comport with closecorporation reality. See Tennery, The Potential of the Close Corporation:A Question of
Economic Validity, 14 How. L.J. 241, 256 (1968).
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should have little relevance in most consensual creditor disregard
cases,' unless they otherwise indicate a fraud on creditors. 5' In these
cases, the policies supporting limited liability should prevail over those
favoring compensation of creditors because the equities of an unpaid
corporate debtor and failed to
creditor who was free to evaluate 15the
5
obtain security are not compelling.
The policies favoring limited liability in consensual creditor cases,
however, are significantly lessened when the transaction is tainted with
fraud, deception, or misrepresentation. 56 When the corporation's financial adequacy is misrepresented or the fact of incorporation is suppressed, the consensual nature of the transaction is vitiated and the
corporate veil should be pierced. 7 Moreover, if the corporation, by
fraudulent or unjust means, takes actions after the contract is consummated that render it difficult or impossible for the creditor to collect his5
debt from the corporation, the disregard remedy should be available. 1
Application of the disregard remedy in these cases is analogous to ac153. See, e.g., DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681,
686 n.13 (4th Cir. 1976) (inadequate capitalization); Moe v. Harris, 142 Minn. 442, 44445, 172 N.W. 494, 495 (1919).
154. See Ahim v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 263-64, 143 N.W.2d 65, 68-69 (1968); Comment, supra note 144, at 465 (a showing of control by shareholder over corporation may
give rise to inference of fraud).
155. See, e.g., Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F. Supp. 91, 99 (E.D.
Tenn. 1977); Quickick, Inc. v. Quickick Int'l, 304 So. 2d 402, 408-10 (La. Ct. App.) (where
consensual creditor not deceived as to debtor's financial status, corporate veil will not be
pierced), cert. denied, 305 So. 2d 123 (La. 1974); Hanson v. Bradley, 298 Mass. 371, 381,
10 N.E.2d 259, 264 (1937); Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., Inc., 309 N.Y. 103, 106, 127
N.E.2d 832, 833 (1955).
156. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp.
610, 617-18 (N.D. Me. 1977) (fraud or misrepresentation required in the contract cases
because parties are free to weigh the potential benefits and risks of the agreement);
Gillespie, supra note 6, at 390-91; Comment, supra note 66, at 135.
157. See, e.g., Ahlm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 264, 143 N.W.2d 65, 69 (1966); Whitney
v. Leighton, 225 Minn. 1, 8-9, 30 N.W.2d 329, 333 (1947), aff'd on rehearing, 225 Minn.
12, 30 N.W.2d 335 (1948); Note, supra note 88, at 1129 (failure to investigate should not
bar recovery in cases of fraud or misrepresentation).
158. Comment, supra note 144, at 470 (this type of conduct indicates the transaction
or its repercussions were not consensual in nature). Professor Bradley has proposed the
following statute to "govern disregard actions involving consensual creditors:
The existence of the corporation as a legal entity distinct from its shareholders
and the shareholders' privilege of limited liability shall not be affected by the
fact that the affairs of the corporation are directly managed by the shareholders;
nor by the fact that the board of directors of the corporation are parties to
agreements respecting the exercise of their powers; nor by the fact that lawful
restrictions are imposed upon the transfer of the stock of the corporation. In the
absence of actual fraud, persons who voluntarily engage in any kind of dealings
or transactions with a corporation, on a corporate basis, may look only to the
assets of the corporation for the satisfaction of claims arising out of those dealings or transactions.
Bradley, supra note 152, at 554.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 3
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

tions "for damages arising from contracts induced by false representation. '
B.

Tort or Nonconsensual Creditors

The standards to be applied by the courts in cases involving tort or
nonconsensual creditors should be significantly different from those
applied in consensual creditor cases. "' The tort creditor normally does
not intend to bargain with the corporation; unlike the consensual creditor, the nonconsensual creditor generally has no opportunity to investigate the financial adequacy of the corporation or to obtain shareholder
guaranty of the liability. "' Consequently, the equities favoring compensation for nonconsensual creditors, especially where personal injury is
involved, are much stronger than in consensual creditor cases. "2 For this
reason, factors such as inadequate capitalization, disregard of corporate
formalities, and shareholder dominance should play a more important
role in nonconsensual disregard cases than in consensual creditor
cases. "
Inadequate capitalization in corporate disregard law is an elusive concept. In Minnesota, any corporation can commence business with a
capitalization of $1,000'"1 and there is no requirement that public liabil159. See, e.g., I.L. Corse & Co. v. Minnesota Grain Co., 94 Minn. 331, 335, 102 N.W.
728, 729 (1905).
160. E.g., Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967) (the distinguishing factor is
creditor reliance in a consensual transaction), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968).
161. E.g., Hanson Sw. Corp. v. Dal-Mac Constr. Co., 554 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1977) (courts are less reluctant to pierce in tort cases than in contract cases because
the creditor in contract cases had the opportunity to select his debtor; in a tort case, no
such selection is made); Comment, supra note 144, at 443-44.,
162. E.g., Gillespie, supra note 6, at 392 (depending upon one's value system, it is
arguable that the nonconsensual creditor should receive more sympathetic treatment than
the consensual creditor); Note, supra note 88, at 1130 (involuntary creditor has greater
equity); 10 Sw. L.J. 77, 79 (1956) (courts are more willing to pierce in tort cases).
163. See Gillespie, supra note 6, at 392 (shareholder dominance and failure to follow
formalities are relevant because they suggest a measure of responsibility for corporation's
actions). But see Comment, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of
Their Corporations?,76 YAa L.J. 1190, 1193 (1967) (liability based on lack of formalities
makes compensation depend upon purely fortuitous circumstances); 1975 WASH. U.L.Q.
201 (1975) (corporate activities unrelated to plaintiff's suit should be irrelevant). In the
classic work, Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary
Corporations,39 YALE L.J. 193 (1929), the authors proposed the following standards which
parent corporations should follow to avoid liability to subsidiary tort creditors: (1) a
separate and sufficient financial unit should be set up and maintained, (2) the day-today business of the two units should be kept separate, (3) the formal barriers between the
two management structures should be maintained, and (4) the two units should not be
represented as being one unit. Id. at 196-97. The authors suggest these considerations are
less relevant in contract cases where fraud or an inequitable result apparently is required.
See id. at 217-18.
164. See MINN. STAT. § 301.04(6) (1976). Obviously, minimum statutory capitalization
does not offer much protection for corporate creditors. See Note, Statutory Minimum
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ity insurance be maintained. 6 5 Consequently, it probably is improper to
impose shareholder liability simply because the corporation does not
have sufficient assets to cover all tort liabilities; a more restrictive standard is necessary.' 0 A standard that has received judicial acceptance is
that capitalization is inadequate when grossly disproportionate to the
nature of the business and the risks reasonably foreseeable to the operation of the business.' This standard is sound because it recognizes that
limited liability is an important and justifiable reason for incorporation,
yet it also recognizes that shareholders should have some duty to have
funds or insurance available to compensate persons injured by the corporation's foreseeable torts.6 8
In nonconsensual creditor cases, inadequate capitalization should be
a critical factor,6 9 but it is unclear whether inadequate capitalization
alone should justify imposition of shareholder liability. 79 One can argue
CapitalizationRequirements, 5 WILLAMETrE L.J. 331, 339 (1969); Comment, supra note
163, at 1190-91 (inadequately capitalized corporations are inevitable product of incorporation; modem statutes invite financial irresponsibility). It has been suggested that to
protect creditors, existing stated capital requirements be abandoned in favor of higher
capital requirements that cannot be reduced. See Note, The Inadequacy of Stated Capital
Requirements, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 823, 841 (1971).
165. For most businesses, liability insurance is essential and the cost is not prohibitive.
See Gillespie, supra note 6, at 402.
166. See Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1960) (legislatures
sanction minimum capitalization); Gillespie, supra note 6, at 386; 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 538,
539 (1957) (mere failure of payment not sufficient basis for piercing). See generally Annot.,
63 A.L.R.2d 1051 (1959). Compliance with minimum statutory capitalization does not
create a presumption of adequate capitalization. See Note, Statutory Minimum Capitalization Requirements, 5 WILLAMETrE L.J. 331, 340-41 (1969).
167. See Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944); Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497,
502 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941). State and federal statutes offer an
alternative definition of inadequate capitalization that may be relevant to the capitalization definition in disregard law. Section five of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act
and section 67(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act deem fraudulent any transaction that leaves
the debtor with an unreasonably small capital from which to satisfy claims. See Sheahin,
Complaint Alleging Inadequate Capitalization,55 ILL. B.J. 881, 884 (1967).
168. Cf. Viiliainen v. American Finnish Workers Soc'y, 236 Minn. 412, 416, 53 N.W.2d
112, 115 (1952) (corporations under unqualified responsibility to act compatibly with
public interest); In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 212-13, 45 N.W.2d 388, 392 (1950)
(same).
169. See Gillespie, supra note 6, at 392; Hamilton, supra note 67, at 988 (inadequate
capitalization should be important factor in determining whether shareholders will be
held liable for corporate torts); Note, supra note 93, at 1013 (in cases of corporate negligence, inadequate capital should be a primary factor); cf. Schoenberg v. Benner, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 154, 165, 59 Cal. Rptr. 359, 367 (1967) (contract case).
170. See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 439 F. Supp.
610, 617 n.7 (N.D. Me. 1977); Harris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App. 3d 837, 841-42, 87 Cal. Rptr.
614, 618-19 (1970); North Arlington Medical Bldg., Inc. v. Sanchez Constr. Co., 86 Nev.
515, 522, 471 P.2d 240, 244 (1970).
Several reasons support the view against basing disregard on inadequate capitalization
only: (1) concern that hindsight would play too dominant a role in the evaluation, (2)
difficulties apparent in formulating a workable measure, and (3) low statutory capitalizaof the issue. 56 MICH. L. REv. 299, 300 (1957).
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that at least in cases involving grossly undercapitalized corporations
with significant and readily foreseeable tort liabilities, such as blasting
companies, inadequate capitalization alone should justify disregarding
the corporate entity.' 7' It would be unconscionable to allow dangerous
enterprises to do business without liability insurance and with only the
statutory minimum of capitalization, thus shifting all risks of the business upon a public not having the means to obtain prior guaranty of
compensation for resulting injuries.' 72 Thus, for firms that have significant tort liability exposure, shareholder liability to nonconsensual creditors should follow on the basis of inadequate capitalization alone.'" This
standard is vague, but the courts should be capable of determining
which corporations pose a serious risk to public safety and the reasonacompensate persons injured by corpoble amount of capital needed to
7
rate torts in view of that risk.'
On the other hand, where a corporation does not have significant
exposure to tort liability, inadequate capitalization alone may not justify shareholder liability.' 7 The lack of a legislative requirement of liability insurance and the minimal statutory capitalization requirement
indicate a legislative intent favoring the limited liability principle even
in tort cases. In these situations, an additional requirement that the
shareholders must have disregarded corporate formalities by, for example, commingling corporate and shareholder funds or not keeping adequate corporate records might be reasonable.'" The rationale for this
171. See Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (taxis), aff'd sub nom.
Mull v. Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1966); Dixie Coal Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Williams, 221 Ala. 331, 128 So. 799 (1930) (compensation action for miner's death); Corrigan & Schirott, supra note 148, at 129 (corporation engaged in dangerous activities may
be undercapitalized regardless of amount); Note, supra note 93, at 1013 (if the business
is risky, a greater amount of protection for creditors should be required).
172. See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 426, 223 N.E.2d 6, 13, 276 N.Y.S.2d
585, 595-96 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Hamilton, supra note 67, at 988 (corporate disregard on the basis of inadequate capitalization prevents a risky business from transferring
its risk of loss to innocent members of the general public).
173. See Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 579-80, 364 P.2d 473, 475-76, 15 Cal. Rptr.
641, 643-44 (1961) (in bank) (shareholder held liable for death of plaintiff's daughter in
corporation's swimming pool; corporation had no assets); Comment, supra note 66, at 136
(inadequate capitalization is particularly relevant where corporation in contact with significant segment of public).
174. Expert testimony by accountants and financial analysts will aid in this process.
Cf. Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 1958) (expert opinion of inadequate
capitalization in bankruptcy). The courts are required to make similar determinations in
analogous areas of the law, such as with the abnormally dangerous activities theory of
strict liability in tort law. See, e.g., REsTATEmENT (SzcoND) OF TORTS §§ 519-524 (1977); 3
WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 310 (1977).
175. See N. LATrIN, THE LAW OF CORPOaAnONs 76-77 (2d ed. 1971) (popcorn man on
street corner would be adequately capitalized at the $1,000 statutory minimum because
little danger of large tort liability).
176. See Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273-74 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988
(1968); Dillman v. Nobles, 351 So. 2d 210, 213 (La. Ct. App. 1977); InadequateCapitaliza-
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additional requirement involves what might be termed a "quid pro
quo" '77 theory: where the shareholders have not respected the existence
of the corporate entity, the courts similarly should be less reluctant to
recognize the corporate existence and limited liability. Legislatures and
courts expect that shareholders will observe corporate formalities. Although disregard of formalities is not fatal to corporate existence,' it
is not unreasonable to withhold the limited liability characteristic of
corporateness when the shareholders do not respect the corporation. In
nonconsensual creditor cases involving inadequately capitalized corporations, the equities in favor of compensating victims of corporate torts
are strong. When the shareholders of such corporations have disregarded
corporate formalities, the balance should be tipped in favor of compensating victims of their torts by imposing shareholder liability." Thus,
where a corporation not having significant tort liability exposure is inadequately capitalized and the shareholders fail to observe corporate formalities, the piercing remedy should be applied.'
Evidence of failure to observe formalities typically will not have any
causal relation to the nonconsensual creditor's injury. This standard,
therefore, may be criticized for injecting irrelevant, purely fortuitous
evaluations into the disregard analysis. Admittedly, this suggestion involves a value judgment. Failure to observe formalities suggests that the
shareholders do not view their business organization as a corporation.' 8'
The courts should view the organization similarly if the corporation is
inadequately capitalized and is not exposed to significant tort liability.
A final and difficult question concerning inadequate capitalization
must be addressed: should the inadequacy of capitalization be determined as of the commencement of business as a corporation or as of the
commission of the tort? 82 Because adequacy of capitalization in torttion: The California Approach, supra note 152, at 859 (when disregard of formalities is
combined with financial management that leads to bankruptcy, personal liability may
result). Where corporate formalities are observed, however, the corporate entity should not
be so readily disregarded. See Cornwell v. Williams Bros. Lumber Co., 139 Ga. App. 773,
229 S.E.2d 551 (1976) (disregard not granted in tort action against parent corporation
where corporations located on different floors of building, assets not commingled, bank
accounts separate, equipment separate, tax returns separate, minute books separate,
bylaws separate, corporate records separate, liability insurance policies separate, employees and payrolls separate).
177. "Quid pro quo" means "something for something." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1415
(4th ed. 1968).
178. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
179. See Note, supra note 88, at 1130-31.
180. Failure to observe corporate formalities without a showing of inadequate capitalization, however, should not justify shareholder liability in view of the strong policies
supporting the corporate device. Note, supra note 150, at 186-87.
181. Gillespie, supra note 6, at 392 (shareholder failure to observe corporate formalities
is relevant because it suggests a measure of responsibility for corporation's actions).
182. In Inadequate Capitalization:The CaliforniaApproach, supra note 152, at 823, the
writer suggests that adequacy of capitalization should be measured at the time of incorpo-

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978

29

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 3
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4

creditor cases will often involve a determination of whether liability
insurance has been purchased,113 the most reasonable rule probably
would be to recognize a continuing obligation that the corporation be
adequately capitalized." 4 If a corporation is grossly undercapitalized in
view of foreseeable tort liabilities, it should maintain an adequate liability insurance policy; if that corporation cannot afford such a policy, or
neglects to obtain one, it should continue business at the shareholders'
risk, not at the risk of the public." 5 Consequently, corporations should
be required to maintain adequate capitalization throughout corporate
existence to assure compensation for claims of nonconsensual creditors.
The requirement that shareholders maintain adequate capitalization
probably should not, however, be applied in cases involving consensual
creditors as distinguished from nonconsensual creditors. Because consensual creditors may investigate capitalization and obtain security, the
risk of inadequate capitalization should be placed upon the creditor as
a risk of business.
A final factor that may be relevant in nonconsensual creditor cases is
shareholder dominance of the corporation. Shareholder dominance is a
pervasive concept in corporate disregard law. 88 The difficulty with using
this factor is that no definition of dominance or control can be fashioned
that distinguishes impermissible dominance from the dominance that
typifies most corporations, especially close corporations." Thus, dominance or control probably is not a satisfactory factor to be considered
in most cases.'
ration, otherwise no corporation would ever be afforded limited liability at the time of
financial difficulty. This suggestion equates inadequate capitalization for disregard purposes with mere insolvency. Inadequate capitalization in disregard law refers to capitalization grossly disproportionate to foreseeable liability in the business. See notes 167-68 supra
and accompanying text. Thus at the time of business failure, liability would attach under
the inadequate capitalization standard only if the amount involved was grossly disproportionate to the corporation's foreseeable liability, not if the corporation was merely insolvent. This Note proposes that adequate capitalization be an ongoing requirement. See text
accompanying note 184 infra. If shareholders of financially threatened corporations fail
to maintain adequate capitalization, they should accept the risk or cease doing business
altogether. Dix, Adequate Risk Capital: The Considerationfor the Benefits of Separate
Incorporation, 53 Nw. U.L. Rav. 478, 494 (1958).
183. See Inadequate Capitalization:The CaliforniaApproach, supra note 152, at 841
n.74.
184. See DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 686
(4th Cir. 1976); Dix, supra note 182, at 491; Comment, supra note 66, at 139.
185. See Comment, supra note 163, at 1201-04 (suggesting requirement of compulsory
insurance for small corporations).
186. See, e.g., Maryland v. General Stevedoring Co., 213 F. 51, 77-78 (D. Md.), aff'd
sub nor. Joseph R. Foard Co. v. Maryland, 219 F. 827 (4th Cir. 1914).
187. See, e.g., AhIm v. Rooney, 274 Minn. 259, 264, 143 N.W.2d 65, 69 (1966).
188. See Note, supra note 62, at 1086 (all one-shareholder corporations of necessity are
dominated by their shareholders; therefore, any close corporation could be pierced if
piercing were allowed on the basis of shareholder dominance alone). Professor Dobbyn,
on the other hand, views the control element as crucial to the disregard analysis. He

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/3

30

et al.: Disregard of the Corporate Entity
19781

DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY

The dominance or control factor should have some significance, however, in cases involving inadequately capitalized subsidiary or affiliated
corporations without significant tort liability exposure, where the policies favoring limited liability are not as strong.'89 In these cases, it is
possible to formulate an acceptable standard of impermissible dominance or control. 90 If a subsidiary or affiliated corporation has independent management that determines the capitalization of the corporation,
then dominance or control is not present. 9' If, however, the parent and
subsidiary or control and affiliated corporations have virtually identical
9 2
directors and officers,, dominance and control probably are present.
Dominance or control should then be considered as a factor, when combined with inadequate capitalization, to justify piercing in the multiplecorporation setting. "3
proposes a test of disregard for both consensual and nonconsensual claims upon a showing
of shareholder control of a corporation and use of that control to hinder unjustly a creditor's ability to collect. Dobbyn, supra note 12, at 190. Dobbyn's reliance on the control
factor in the close-corporation context seems to ignore the reality of control and dominance that typifies close corporations. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
189. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
190. In 1931 Professor Powell proposed the following three-part test of disregard in cases
involving parent and subsidiary or affiliated corporation cases: (1) defendant's control, (2)
defendant's fraud or wrong, and (3) unjust loss or injury to the creditor. F. POWELL, PARENT
AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 103-05 (1931). This test, incorporating the control and fraud
rule that should govern multiple-corporation disregard cases, is still valid. Powell found
several indicia of sufficient parent control:
(1) parent owns all of the subsidiary's stock;
(2) common directors or officers of corporations;
(3) parent finances the subsidiary;
(4) parent subscribes to all the stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes its
incorporation;
(5) subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital;
(6) parent pays salaries and other expenses or losses of the subsidiary;
(7) subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent or has no
assets except those conveyed to it by the parent;
(8) parent describes subsidiary as a department or division;
(9) parent uses subsidiary's assets as its own;
(10) directors and officers of subsidiary do not act independently but rather
take orders from the parent;
(11) formal legal requirements of subsidiary are not observed.
Id.
191. See Cornwell v. Williams Bros. Lumber Co., 139 Ga. App. 773, 229 S.E.2d 551
(1976) (tort action against parent corporation; of eight directors only two were common
to both and only three of eight shareholders were common; disregard not granted); Note,
supra note 19, at 222 (affiliated corporations with identical shareholders may be operating
in entirely different fields and have no business dealings in common).
192. See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104, 112-13 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Anoka Nat'l Bank, 108 F.
482, 486 (8th Cir. 1901) (disregard granted where defendant dominated and controlled
subsidiary; officers were identical); American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach &
Moore, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 412, 414-15 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
193. See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104, 113 (7th Cir.
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C. Allocation of Liability
When the corporate disregard remedy is appropriate, the further issue
arises concerning who should be held personally liable. Under traditional application of the remedy, which has been followed in Minnesota,'" the corporation is treated as a partnership and all shareholders
are held liable as partners.'9 5 This mechanical approach can unjustly
punish innocent shareholders who may be only passive investors.
The Minnesota court in the case of In re Will of Clarke' presented
an alternative approach to the allocation of shareholder liability. Under
Clarke only the individual responsible for the fraud or injustice will be
held liable, thus avoiding the injustice of holding shareholders liable
who are not responsible for the fraudulent or inequitable conduct of the
corporation. 97 The Clarke rule appears to be the better approach. Thus,
each case should be analyzed separately to determine which shareholders perpetrated the fraud or reasonably could have stopped the fraud
from occurring, rather than automatically holding all shareholders personally liable.
D.

Summary

In summary, this Note advocates the use of varying standards in
corporate disregard cases, depending upon the nature of the claim and
the type of shareholder involved. In consensual or contract creditor
cases, limited liability should be preserved unless: (1) the shareholders
misrepresent the financial stability of the corporation or the fact of
incorporation, or (2) the shareholders, after contracting, render it difficult or impossible for the creditor to receive payment for the debt because of fraud or other injustice. In nonconsensual or tort creditor cases,
the standards should vary. If the corporation is engaged in a business
involving significant foreseeable tort liability, inadequate capitalization
alone should justify piercing the corporate veil. If the corporation is not
engaged in a business involving significant foreseeable tort liability,
both inadequate capitalization and disregard of corporate formalities by
shareholders should be required. Finally, if the case involves parent and
subsidiary or affiliated corporations not engaged in a business involving
significant foreseeable tort liability, inadequate capitalization plus
dominance should be sufficient to invoke the corporate disregard remedy.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Gentry v. Credit Plan Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 57374 (Tex. 1975).
194. See Manufacturers Bldg., Inc. v. Heller, 306 Minn. 180, 183, 235 N.W.2d 825, 827
(1975), noted in 3 WM. MrTcHELL L. REv. 293 (1977).
195. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
196. 204 Minn. 574, 284 N.W. 876 (1939).
197. Accord, Inadequate Capitalization:The California Approach, supra note 152, at
835 n.57 (not all shareholders should be held personally liable; only those in a position to
affect capital structure should be held liable).
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EXCEPTIONAL APPLICATIONS OF THE CORPORATE DISREGARD THEORY

The corporate disregard doctrine described above is designed to apply
in the typical case involving tort and contract creditors seeking to hold
corporate shareholders personally liable for corporate debts. Corporate
disregard also has application in cases not involving tort or contract
creditors that require a special policy evaluation normally foreign to the
typical case. Three types of these cases deserve special mention: cases
involving probate administration, cases involving attempted evasion of
statutes, and cases involving disputes among shareholders. It is important to recognize that the relative ease with which the courts sometimes
disregard corporate entities in these cases is attributable primarily to
peculiar policies not present in normal creditor disregard cases; therefore the language and standards contained in these special cases should
not be relied upon in other corporate disregard cases.
A.

ProbateAdministration

The doctrine of corporate disregard sometimes plays a role in the
administration of estates, where the testator owned all the stock of a
small corporation.'98 The problem generally arises because the testator
devises corporate property directly to his devisees, rather than devising
the shares of the corporation.'' In these cases, the courts often are

liberal in applying the corporate disregard remedy to uphold the devise,
which would otherwise fail because the testator shareholder technically
cannot transfer corporate property but rather can transfer only his
shares in the corporation.2° The decision whether to pierce in these cases
and treat the corporate property as that of the testator depends primarily upon whether corporate creditors would be disadvantaged. If corporate creditors would not be disadvantaged by disregarding the corporate
entity, then there can be little objection to upholding the devise and
thereby fulfilling the testator's intent.20 '
198. See generally Younger, Death and the Close Corporation,34 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1
(1967); Comment, Corporations: Disregard of the Corporate Entity for the Benefit of
Shareholders, 1963 DUKE L.J. 722, 731-32.
199. See H. BALLANmNE, supra note 2, § 125; Fuller, supra note 6, at 1397-401.
200. See, e.g., In re Bauer's Will, 289 N.Y. 326, 332-33, 45 N.E.2d 897, 899 (1942) (oneshareholder corporation disregarded and corporate money used to pay gifts in shareholdertestator's will); In re Stukalo's Will, 7 Misc. 2d 1042, 166 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sur. Ct. 1957)
(testator owned 99 of 100 shares); In re Dunigan's Will, 177 Misc. 212, 215-16, 30 N.Y.S.2d
38, 42 (Sur. Ct. 1941); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Service Laundry Co., 160 Tenn. 57, 61-63, 22
S.W.2d 6, 8 (1929). But see Crane v. Horton, 287 Mass. 160, 163-64, 191 N.E. 391, 392
(1934). See also In re Trust Created by Warner, 263 Minn. 449, 458, 117 N.W.2d 224, 230
(1962) (where corporation is used only as convenient mode for administering trust property, it will be disregarded in accounting dispute).
201. See In re Turley's Estate, 160 Misc. 190, 192-93, 289 N.Y.S. 704, 706-07 (Sur. Ct.
1936) (where there are no intervening interests, corporate entity may be disregarded to
effectuate decedent's intent); In re Winburn's Will, 136 Misc. 19, 22, 240 N.Y.S. 208, 210-
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Avoidance of Statutory Obligations

Corporations sometimes are formed in an attempt by the shareholders
to avoid the effect of obligations imposed by statutes. Not all such
attempts necessarily are evil; they frequently are upheld as legitimate
uses of the corporate entity. 2 '
Shareholders cannot invoke the corporate entity as a defense to criminal prosecutions in cases where they are personally guilty of criminal
conduct. For example, in State v. McBride0 3 defendant was charged
with selling intoxicating liquor without a license. The sale was made by
an employee of a corporation owned and managed by defendant. The
corporation was a closed one and was dominated by defendant, who
knew liquor was on the premises for purposes of sale. Defendant claimed
he could not be held criminally liable for the criminal acts of the corporation's employee. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that the existence of a corporation was irrelevant and that defendant
was guilty as an accessory because he hired and supervised the employee
and attempted to use the corporation merely as a shield to protect himself from criminal liability. The court noted that corporate officers normally are not criminally liable for the acts of other agents of the corporation, but can be criminally liable as aiders, abettors, or accessories,
despite the fact that a corporate entity is involved."' The principles
espoused in McBride are sound; the corporate entity cannot be the basis
for negating criminal liability where the individual is personally responsible for the crime either directly or as an accessory. 0 5 And although the
McBride court spoke in terms of corporate disregard, that doctrine actually need not be invoked in these cases. Rather, the individual merely
is being held personally responsible for his own criminal conduct.0 6
11 (Sur. Ct. 1930) (devise upheld; corporation had sufficient assets to satisfy corporate
creditors).
202. For example, it is normally legitimate to form a corporation to avoid personal
liability for future obligations. Canfield, supra note 79, at 141.
203. 152 Minn. 123, 9 N.W.2d 416 (1943).
204. Id. at 130, 9 N.W.2d at 420.
205. See Sell v. United States, 336 F.2d 467, 472 (10th Cir. 1964); State v. Creamery
Package Mfg. Co., 110 Minn. 415, 433, 126 N.W. 126, 129 (1910) (illegal monopoly);
Commonwealth v. Bonetti, 211 Pa. Super. 161-, 165, 235 A.2d 447, 449 (1967) (worthless
check); State v. Milbrath, 138 Wis. 354, 361, 120 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (1909) (embezzlement); Berle, supra note 140, at 353 (same result even if articles of incorporation state
crime to be corporation's business purpose).
206. Direct criminal liability of shareholders is illustrated in the recent case of State v.
Strimling, No. 47542 (Minn. Mar. 10, 1978). Defendant shareholders were prosecuted for
submitting to the state fraudulent nursing home cost reports to obtain reimbursement
from welfare funds for services rendered to low-income patients. Defendants' practice of
diverting corporate assets to their own use resulted in the appearance of artificially high
operating costs. The cost reports were prepared by an officer of the corporation. Defendants contended that they did not authorize or approve the practice and thus should be
absolved from liability. The court held the respondeat superior argument irrelevant because the defendants were charged as aiders and abettors of the criminal acts. In response
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Where the statute attempted to be avoided is noncriminal, the courts
tend to take a different view than in criminal cases by attempting to
distinguish between bona fide avoidance and impermissible evasion of
statutory restrictions. 07 Bona fide avoidance usually involves avoidance
of a statute designed for the benefit of the individual who incorporates,
as opposed to avoidance of statutes designed to protect third parties.M
For example, usury statutes are intended to shield individuals from
overreaching by unscrupulous lenders, and they usually except corporate borrowers from their scope." ' The courts normally will permit individuals to incorporate for the purpose of avoiding usury statutes. 1 ' The
rationale for this result appears to be twofold: the interests of thirdparty creditors are not involved, and the individual who made the decision to incorporate should not thereafter be allowed to have the corporate entity disregarded for his own benefit."'
Impermissible evasion, on the other hand, occurs where the corporate
entity is used to evade a noncriminal statute that was enacted to protect
the government or third parties. In this instance the courts have been
more willing to apply the corporate disregard remedy."' If the statute
or regulation in question would be subverted by incorporation and the
legitimate interests of the state or a third party would be adversely
affected, the fact of incorporation will be ignored by the courts. 13 Taxato defendants' alternative argument that the corporation ratified their actions, the court
declared emphatically that the corporate entity cannot immunize shareholder criminal
liability by ratification.
207. See Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Snyder, 79 F.2d 263, 266-67 (8th Cir. 1935); H.
BAL.AN1rNE, supra note 2, § 132.
208. See, e.g., Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946)
(corporate entities will be disregarded when used to avoid a clear legislative purpose; they
will not be disregarded when chosen to secure advantages and no violence to legislative
purpose results if not disregarded).
209. See Charmoll Fashions, Inc. v. Otto,__ Minn ....
248 N.W.2d 717, 719
(1976), noted in 4 WM. MITCHEIL L. REv. 227 (1978); Dahmes v. Industrial Credit Co., 261
Minn. 26, 31, 110 N.W.2d 484, 487 (1961); MINN. STAT. § 334.021 (1976).
210. See, e.g., Gangadean v. Flori Inv. Co., 106 Ariz. 245, 247, 474 P.2d 1006, 1008
(1970); Rabinowich v. Eliasberg, 159 Md. 655, 663, 152 A. 437, 440 (1930); Jenkins v.
Moyse, 254 N.Y. 319, 324, 172 N.E. 521, 522 (1930). See generally Note, Incorporationto
Avoid Usury Laws, 68 COLUM. L. Rav. 1390 (1968); Note, Efficacy of the CorporateEntity
in Evasion of Statutes, 26 IOWA L. REv. 350, 357-58 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Evasion
of Statutes]; 15 MINN. L. REV.112, 113 (1930) (parties may shape their transactions "with
the usury laws before their eyes"). The result may be otherwise, however, where the lender
deceptively induces the debtor to incorporate to circumvent the usury law. See, e.g.,
Gelber v. Kugel's Tavern, Inc., 10 N.J. 191, 196-97, 89 A.2d 654, 657 (1952). See generally
Comment, supra note 198, at 724-26.
211. See, e.g., Toffolon v. Town of Avon, __
Conn ....
378 A.2d 580, 587
(1977); Sams v. Redevelopment Auth., 431 Pa. 240, 244-45, 244 A.2d 779, 781 (1968);
Evasion of Statutes, supra note 210, at 357-58; note 75 supra and accompanying text.
212. The rationale for this result apparently is that there can be no immunity granted
to a corporation which will permit it to evade the policies established by the legislature.
Evasion of Statutes, supra note 210, at 351.
213. See Canfield, supra note 79, at 135 (where statute is designed to prevent a "serious
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tion cases provide a good example of this distinction. As a general rule
1
the corporate entity is a separate entity for taxation purposes." ' Preferential tax treatment is a justifiable reason for incorporating in most
cases. 215 However, the rule is well established that when incorporation
is for the sole purpose of tax evasion the corporate entity will be disregarded for tax purposes.21 1 This rule is commonly justified under the
business purpose doctrine; if a corporation is formed for no business
purpose except the evasion of taxation it may be disregarded.2 1 7 Thus,
proof of shareholder dominance, failure to observe corporate formalities,
and inadequate capitalization normally should not be relevant if the
a business activity and was more than merely a
corporation carried on
2 18
tax avoidance device.
C.

The Internal-DealingsRule

The internal-dealings rule of corporate disregard law is a little-used
rule that can be applied to settle conflicts among shareholders of a close
corporation where the rights of third parties and creditors are not involved.2 1' The apparent rationale of the rule is that when a close corporapublic evil" courts will disregard corporate entities); Evasion of Statutes, supra note 210,
at 358 (where statute is of "extreme social importance" courts will disregard corporate
entities).
214. E.g., Webber v. Knox, 97 F.2d 921, 923 (8th Cir. 1938) (corporation and sole
shareholder not identical for purposes of computing capital gains holding period); George
A. Hormel & Co. v. United States, 10 F. Supp. 623, 626 (D. Minn.) (a corporation and its
shareholders generally are separate and distinct in tax matters), appeal dismissed, 82 F.2d
1011 (8th Cir. 1935); Milwaukee Motor Transp. Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 292
Minn. 66, 73, 193 N.W.2d 605, 609 (1971) (courts are reluctant to disregard separate legal
entities merely to grant shareholders tax relief); Cargill, Inc. v. Spaeth, 215 Minn. 540,
547, 10 N.W.2d 728, 732 (1943) (corporation and shareholder will be treated separately
for income tax purposes except where corporation is used merely for tax avoidance purposes).
215. See B. BrrrmE

& J. Eusnc,

FEERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORAnIONS AND

SHAREHoLDERs 1.02 (3d ed. 1971) (disparity between relatively flat corporate rates and
graduated individual rates is constant inducement to investment in corporations).
216. See, e.g., E. Albrecht & Son v. Landy, 114 F.2d 202, 204 (8th Cir. 1940); James
Realty Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 306, 311 (D. Minn. 1959), affd, 280 F.2d 394
(8th Cir. 1960). See generally 7 J. MEmrrsNs, THE LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 38.07.15 (1976); Cleary, The CorporateEntity in Tax Cases, 1 TAx L. Rzv. 3 (1945).
217. See Minnesota Farm Bureau Sec. Inc. v. United States, 63-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH)
9138 (D. Minn. 1963); James Realty Co. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 306, 311 (D. Minn.
1959), aff'd, 280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960); Community Hosp. Linen Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation,

-

Minn.

_

245 N.W.2d 190, 195 (1976); Note, Disregard

of the CorporateEntity in Tax Cases, 80 U. PA. L. Rev. 892, 895 (1932) (suggesting that
the disregard doctrine in tax law is normally premised on fraud).
218. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 455, 457 (1st Cir. 1971); Skarda v.
Commissioner, 250 F.2d 429, 433-35 (10th Cir. 1957).
219. See Sale v. Ambler, 335 Pa. 165, 171, 6 A.2d 519, 521-22 (1939); Harrison v. Puga,
4 Wash. App. 52, 63, 480 P.2d 247, 254-55 (1971); 1 W. FiErCHzR, supra note 8, § 46; 68
HARv. L. Rev. 541, 542 (1952) (internal-dealings theory should not apply where third
parties are involved).
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tion is operated basically as a partnership, then partnership law is the
most appropriate source to determine the rights of shareholders inter
se.1°0 This rule can be valuable in determining these shareholder rights
where corporate law does not satisfactorily do so. 22' However, the rule
should not be invoked where legislatively or judicially created principles
of corporate law adequately resolve the dispute or are designed to resolve
the dispute.2 22 Thus, the rule should be viewed as supplementing corpo23
rate law principles rather than displacing them.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The corporate device helped bring this nation's economy from its
agrarian origins to the modern industrial model that it is today. Limited
liability of shareholders played a prominent role in that development,
but the evils that can result from its employment for improper purposes
cannot be ignored. The doctrine of corporate disregard recognizes the
equities in favor of the unpaid creditor as well as the policies favoring
corporateness.
Development of the corporate disregard doctrine by the courts often
has been equivocal and deficient in analysis of the important policies
involved; metaphors predominate, remedies are confused, and standards are absent. Although the Minnesota corporate disregard law is no
more refined than most other jurisdictions, it is unique, for it offers two
approaches to corporate disregard. One is the traditional approach, with
its emphasis on fraud, and the second is the Clarke approach, which
simply places liability on the wrongdoer involved without pretending to
pierce any corporate veil. Moreover, in Ahlm v. Rooney2 21 the court
recognized the fallacy of the pervasive dominance factor in disregard
law. The Minnesota court has established a good foundation for disregard analysis. Yet, its overall approach still cannot be considered sufficiently comprehensive.
This Note has advocated the use of varying standards for the courts
to observe in disregard actions. Application of the doctrine should depend upon the nature of the claim and type of shareholder involved. The
nature of the claim is important because different types of claims in220. See 3 WM. MrrCHELL L. Rav. 293, 295 (1977).
221. See Urnest v. Forged Tooth Gear Co., 102 Ill. App. 2d 178, 186, 243 N.E.2d 596,
601 (1968); Siegel v. Ribak, 43 Misc. 2d 7, 13, 249 N.Y.S.2d 903, 908-09 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
222. In Manufacturers Bldg., Inc. v. Heller, 306 Minn. 180, 183, 235 N.W.2d 825, 827
(1975) the court applied the piercing doctrine in a dispute between shareholders. Although
the court did not explain the grounds for piercing, the case can be rationalized by reference
to the internal-dealings rule. See 3 WM. MrrcHLL L. REV. 293, 295 (1977).
223. See I. WORMSzR, THE DISREGARD OF THE CoRORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORATION PROBLEMS 48 (1927) (the entity theory often must be ignored in determining the rights
of stockholders inter se; in these cases, disregard of the concept of corporate entity is
incidental rather than fundamental).
224. 274 Minn. 259, 143 N.W.2d 65 (1966).
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volve different policies affecting limited liability. The disregard remedy
should be available to consensual creditors only upon a showing of some
fraud or misrepresentation. Nonconsensual creditors, on the other hand,
should face a less restrictive burden; because they are unable to choose
their debtor, their ability to be compensated should rest upon different
considerations. Thus, inadequate capitalization, failure to observe corporate formalities, and dominance should have some relevance. Finally,
only those persons who cause the fraudulent or unjust result should be
held liable when the corporate disregard remedy is invoked.
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